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07/09/2010 11:23 208455 LAW OFFICE PAGE 02/04 
SEND ORIGlNAL TO: INDUSTRJAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 
CLAIMA!\'T'S (fN.J1JRV.D WORKER) NAME, ADPRESS, AND TELT;PHONE I'II.IMBER 
Rubio Izaguirre 
,LAIMANT'S AITORNEY'.'5 NAMJF.LAODRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 
D. SCOTT SUMMER,'f'L C 
3517 Hermosa Ave 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Phorie: 208) 453-1584 
~PLOVER'S NAME AND A ODRES~ (at til)l,l!; 0 f injury) 
K&L Carriers Shared Servrces, LLC 
600 Gillam Road 
Wilmington, OH 45177 




P.O. Box 1095 
Caldwell, 10 83606 
Phone: {208) 455~8692 
ORKERS' COMPENSATION INSliRANCI': (CARRIER'S 
NOT ADJU!i_TO!}'S) NAME ANn ADDRESS 
ene' O'I.Jell 
Senior Claims Adjuster 
GALLAGHER BASSETI SERVICES 
720 Park Blvd. Ste. # 125 
Si'ATE ANO COUNTV IN WHJCII IN.Jl.:RV OCCURRf.,IJ 
Utah, Box Elder County 
HEN lN.lllRED, CI .. A IMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAG~EE~ WA~ 
!'J: 
, PURSI.JA;>.<TTO )I)AHOCODI;; 724~ ~ 
OESCRlnl?. HOW IN.HiRY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISF-i\SE OCCtJRRED f\'1/HAT HAPPl'C~ED} 
Claimant was driving a tractor"trailer rig and was hit by another tractor-trailer rig. 
N.o\'T1JRE OF MF.,!JlCAL ~OH'LEMS ALLEGED AS A RESliJ,T OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
Head, neck, chest, upper body and left knee. His left knee has required extensive surgery and will require further surgery in the 
future. 
WfiAT WORKitRS' COMPRNSATTOI'\ BENEFIT!'~ ARE Y(ll) CLAIMING AT THlS TIME? 
Additional medical benefits, TTD benefits, PPI benefrts and attorney fees for unreasonable denial and/or delay in benefits due. 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF !.N,l!JRV WAS GJVF:N TO EMPLOYER 
02-28-2008 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: 
ISSUE OR lSSt:I!,S lNVOLVl'.O 
0 WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN 
Supervisor 
0 OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
Is Claimant due additional statutory benefits as outlined above. 
00 YOl J BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRttSENTS A NEW Ql,JI!.STTON OF LAW OR A COJ\{I'UCATED SET OF Ft.CTS? 0 Yf.S I8J NO IF SO, PLEASE STAT£ WHY. 
NOTICE: COMPLAJNTS AGAINST Tt.IE INDUSTRIA!- SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH IDAHO CODE§ 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002 
IC1001 {Re•.l!Ql/2000) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Compl~lnt- Pa~e 1 Q(3 
Appl!lldix 1 
I 
07/08/2010 FRI 11.24 [D:/R:>:: NO 5818] [i1J002 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 
CLAIMANT'S {INJURED WORKER) NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 
~
Caldwell, 10 83605 
Phone: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at tim~ of injury) 
R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC 
600 Gillam Road 
Wilmington, OH 45177 
CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO. -
83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
ORIGI~\1 
ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 
c 
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
Utah, Box Elder County 
INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 72-419 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED) 
Claimant was driving a tractor-trailer rig and was hit by another tractor-trailer rig. 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
Head, neck, chest, upper body and left knee. His left knee has required extensive surgery and will require further surgery in the 
future. 
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME? 
Additional medical benefits, TTD benefits, PPI benefits and attorney fees for unreasonable denial and/or delay in benefits due. 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEl'l TO EMPLOYER 
02-28-2008 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: ~ORAL 
ISSUE OR ISSUES ll'IVOLVED 
Is Claimant due additional statutory benefits as outlined above. 
0 WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN 
Supervisor 
~WRITTEN 0 OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? 0 YES ~ NO IF SO, P-LEASE STATE WHY. 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH IDAHO CODE§ 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002 
IC1001 (Rev. 3/01/2008) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Complaint- Page i of 3 
Appendix 1 
PHYSICIANS WHO ffiEATED CLAIMANT (NAME 
West Valley Medical Center 
St. Alphonsus Occupational Therapy 
Caldwell Physical Therapy 
Ada Orthopaedic . 
Intermountain Physical Therapy 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE? 
All medicals None 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $ WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?$ 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDI1\.TING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. [g) YES D NO 
DATE 
June 25, 2010 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY 
FILING COMPLAINT 
WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED? 
DYES 0No 
DATE OF DEATH RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT 
DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? 
DYEs DNo 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2_ day of J y,( 7 , 20 J.k., I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Com plaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
{\ik<P-rr-lec.sSk•"-'.P,')qvius,U-C- -~~8As,-E7"f~ 
foe>o s~ llflb tZJ. 7~ f>4!± __ ;iSEtrv: CIJ.r 
L~_y, r ~;'):J-tonj CJH i5177 ~0/Slt' ,7D. ~ i 112-
via: D personal service of process via: D personal service of process 
I;XJ regular U.S. Mail 
~ 
fA--X. 




NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form I.C. 1003 
with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid 
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000. 
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3) 
Complaint- Page 2 of 3 
~ 
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number: _______ _ 
o Pick up Copies o Fax <;:opies # _____ _ 
o Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by:· 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorhe --:--:-:------,-----:-::--::---::----:--:------to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To: ___ ::--~-~~-~--~~=---~~~--~~~--===~=----:--------:--::---
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/Selflnsured Employer/ISIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State Zip·Code 
Purposeorneedfurdata: _______________________________ _ 
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: 
0 Discharge Summary 
Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: ___________ _ 
D History & Physical Exam 
D Consultation Reports 
D Operative Reports 
D Lab 
D Pathology 
D Radiology Reports 
D Entire Record 
D Other: Specify _________________ _ 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
0 AIDSorHIV 
D Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
D Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR 
Part 164) and that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by 
the federal regulations. I understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying 
the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won' t apply to information already released in response 
to this authorization. I understand that the J!trovider will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or 
eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will expire 
upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and 
physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to 
the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature 
below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding 
dis sure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above. 
1 ...., 
~~/ h , zS-tO 
Date 
epresentative & R-elationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
Date 
Complaint - Page 3 of 3 




ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
I. C. NO.: 2008-011032 INJURY DATE: 02-28-08 
X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
D The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME ANO ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S A ITORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Rubio Izaguirre D. Scott Summer 
3517 Hermosa Ave. P.O. Box 1095 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
AND ADDRESS 
R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC 
Zurich American Insurance Co. 600 Gillam Road 
Wilmington, OH 45177 C/0 Gallagher Bassett 
720 Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, ID 83712 
A TIORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND AITORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND 
ADDRESS) 
ALAN R. GARDNER, ESQ. 
GARDNER & BREEN 
P.O. BOX 2528 
BOISE, ID 83701 






;;;::;-o = .... 
""t-:> r'i 




That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint::m:~lly ol:turred on or about the 
i me claimed. '(7, 
(/) 
12. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
~· That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
~. 
a1 
That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly 0 entirely D by an accident 
rising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
NA ~ That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of e employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the 







That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
mployer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation 
such occupational disease. 
7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho 
{', ode, Section 72-419: $ _____ _ 
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
ompensation Act. b 
9. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? None. 
deny of the Complaint not admitted herein. 
2. Defendants deny Claimant is entitled to any medical expenses beyond any previously paid or acknowledged. 
3. Defendants deny Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability. 
4. Defendants deny Claimant is entitled to additional PPI. 
5. Defendants deny Claimant is entitled to attorney fees. 
6. Defendants deny that they have been unreasonable in any aspect of handling the claim. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy 
of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by 
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause 
the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. 
Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D., Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under 
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I. C. 
1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. 0 YES X NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE: 
Amount of Compensation paid to date Dated 
PPI/PPD TTD Medical 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23.u day of July 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
CLAIMANT/ATTORNEY 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
Rubio Izaguirre 
C/0 D. Scott Summer 
P.O. Box 1095 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
via D personal service of process 
X regular U.S. mail 
via 
EMPLOYER/SURETY 
NAME AND ADDRESS 
R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC 
C/0 Gallagher Bassett 
720 Park Blvd., Ste. 125 
Boise, ID 83712 
D 
X 
Answer-Page 2 of 2 
ALAN R. GARDNER, ESQ. (ISB No. 2342) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
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I.C. Case No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST FOR STATUS 
CONFERENCE 
COME NOW the above-named Defendants, and request that the Industrial Commission 
set a status conference in the above matter. The conference is requested for the following 
grounds and reasons: 
a. Claimant has received a 3rd party recovery in the amount of $200,000. 
b. To date, $45,000 (25% attorney fee balance to surety) has been paid to Defendants 
for reimbursement of subrogation under 72-223. 
REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE, P. 1 
c. Because of this factor, a significant cushion from the 3rd party recovery which 
would not be exceeded by Claimant's conditions exists. Thus, every dollar that is 
incurred for future benefits, would be paid only at 25% as a reimbursement to 
Claimant for his attorney fee recovery in the 3rd party, the percentage agreement 
reached with counsel and adjuster. 
d. Given this reality, and Defendants perspectives ofthe reality of the case, incurring 
a great deal of litigation, time and costs does not appear to be productive. Thus, 
the Defendants would like an opportunity to discuss options with the Commission 
to determine how best this case might be resolved given this scenario. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERV 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be served upon: 
D. Scott Summer 
P.O. Box 1095 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, 
the last known address as set forth above. 
REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE, P. 2 
ALAN R. GARDNER, ESQ. (ISB No. 2342) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 West Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
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I.C. No. 2008-011032 
MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES AND RESPONSE 
TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO CLAIMANT 
MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES A."''D RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO CLAIMANT, P. 1 
COME NOW the above-named Defendants, by and through their attorney of 
record, and move the Commission to enter an Order compelling Claimant to answer the 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents propounded to him on or about the 
27th day of July, 2010, pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
DATED This 2nd day of September, 2010. 
MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO CLAIMANT- P. 2 
jo 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of September, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
D. Scott Summer 
P.O. Box 1095 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, the 
last known address as set forth above. /] · 
~· 
MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS TO CLAIMANT- P. 3 
ALAN R. GARDNER, ESQ. (ISB No. 2342) 
GARDNER & BREEN 
1410 W. Washington- 83702 
Post Office Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 387-0881 
Facsimile: (208) 387-3501 
Attorney for Defendants 
ORIGINAL 



























I.C. Case No. 2008-011032 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COME NOW the above named Defendants, and move the Commission for an Order 
Dismissing Complaint for the following grounds and reasons: 
a. Defendants served Claimant with discovery on July 27, 2010. 
b. Defendants sent Claimant a reminder letter to answer discovery on September 1, 
2010. 
MOTION TO DISMISS, P. 1 
c. Defendants filed a Motion to Compel on September 2, 2010. 
d. The Commission issued an Order Compelling Claimant to Answer Discovery on 
September 17, 2010. 
e. To date, Claimant has not answered discovery. 
DATED this day of October, 2010. 
Alan R. Gardiier - oft}(e firm 
GARDNER & BR.J{E:N 
Attorney for Def6ridants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon: 
D. Scott Summer 
P.O. Box 1095 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
day of 2010, I caused a true and correct 
by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the above-named, the 
last known address as set forth above. 
ALAN R. GARDNER 
MOTION TO DISMISS, P. 2 
13 
RICHARDS. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 





























I. C. No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
1. Claimant will be prepared to proceed with hearing after January 1, 2011. 
2. Issues: Need for continued medical care, total temporary disability beneftis, 
retraining, determination of permanent partial impairment; determination of 
permanent partial disability which accounts for all medical and non-medical factors 
and retention of jurisdiction past the statute of limitations. 
3. Location of Hearing: Boise, Idaho. 
4. Unavailable dates: January 1, 10, 14-18,21,28, 31; February 8-14, 21; March 1, 7-
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING- PG. 1 
22, 25, 30; April6, 22, 27-29; May 2, 30, 2011. 
5. Length of Hearing: 1/2 day. 
DATED This ~day of December, 2010. 
By: __ ___:_::~;.__ _  L_~ ____ _ 
Richard S. Owen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ( bdayofDecember, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REQUEST FOR CALENDARING was mailed, U. S. Postage prepaid, to: 
Alan Gardner 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING- PG. 2 
Is-
RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 





























I. C. No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST FOR 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby request this 
Industrial Commission to set this case for a status conference for purposes of setting a hearing date. 
DATED This 1---: )ay ofDecember, 2010. 
By: ___ _,_~ ____ L_~-,...,~-=---
Richard S. Owen 
REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE- PG. 1 
It 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~ Jay of December, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REQUEST FOR CALENDARING was mailed, U.S. Postage prepaid, to: 
Alan R. Gardner 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
RichardS. Owen 
REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE- PG. 2 
/7 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Bauman - ISB #2989 
Wilson - ISB #7962 
Attorneys for Defendants 








FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I.C. No. 2008-011032 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND 
STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
DETERMINATION OF NOVEL ISSUES OF 
LAW 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
DETERMINATION OF NOVEL ISSUES OF LAW- 1 
JF 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Employer R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC ("R&L Carriers"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., hereby submits this Motion to Bifurcate and Stay 
Proceedings for Determination of a Novel Issue of Law. R&L Carriers moves pursuant to Rules 
3 and 8, J.R.P., and other applicable law, that the Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission") 
enter an order bifurcating the subrogation issues from the issues presented for hearing on the 
underlying workers' compensation benefits claim. Claimant Rubio Izaguirre ("Claimant") 
contends that R&L Carriers' and Zurich American Insurance Company's ("Surety") right of 
subrogation is subject to a limitation based on the purported recovery of Claimant's wife for loss 
of consortium. An initial determination by the full Commission of whether Claimant's 
contention is supported by the law will materially advance the resolution of this litigation. 
The potential limitation on R&L Carriers' right of subrogation raised by Claimant's 
contention requires that the Commission interpret Idaho law to determine issues including: (1) 
the threshold question of whether the Release of All Claims permits or effects a limitation on 
R&L Carriers' right of subrogation guaranteed by Idaho Code§ 72-223; (2) whether the 
characterizatiqn of the recovery as among Claimant, his wife, and the third parties is binding on 
R&L Carriers; and (3) whether workers' compensation benefits are community property and, if 
so, whether a recovery for loss of consortium is also community property. This case presents 
issues of first impression and involves potentially complex issues of law, if not of fact. 
Therefore, R&L Carriers requests the full Commission adjudicate the subrogation issues. 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
DETERMINATION OF NOVEL ISSUES OF LAW- 2 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Claimant filed his Workers' Compensation Complaint on June 25,2010, seeking 
workers' compensation benefits for injuries allegedly arising out of a February 28, 2008, motor 
vehicle accident. ("Complaint.") At the time of the accident, Claimant was driving a semi-truck 
for R&L Carriers when another semi-truck hit his truck and caused it to roll. (A true and correct 
copy of Claimant's Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories to Claimant, p. 5, Answer No.6, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A.) Claimant and his wife reached a settlement with Ameri-Co 
Carriers, Inc. and Jimmy L. Crossland, third parties, in the amount of $200,000 with respect to 
the accident. Claimant and his wife signed a Release of All Claims on October 15, 2009, 
memorializing that settlement. (A true and correct copy of the Release of All Claims and 
Indemnity Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) Claimant now contends that R&L 
Carriers should not receive credit for at least half of the $200,000 settlement, as half of the 
settlement proceeds was supposedly allocated to a loss of consortium claim by Claimant's wife. 
(A true and correct copy of the November 13, 2009, letter of D. Scott Summer, former legal 
counsel for Claimant, is attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 
III. ANALYSIS 
R&L Carriers requests bifurcation of the threshold subrogation issues from the issues 
presented for hearing on the underlying workers' compensation benefits claim. Claimant 
contends that R&L Carriers should not receive credit for at least half of the $200,000 settlement, 
due to an allocation to a loss of consortium claim by Claimant's wife. (Ex. C.) R&L Carriers 
requests that the Commission determine what portion of the third party recovery is subject to its 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
DETERMINATION OF NOVEL ISSUES OF L~W- 3 
future subrogated interest prior to a hearing on liability. This determination will necessarily 
involve analysis of issues including, but not limited to, (1) the threshold question of whether the 
Release of All Claims permits or effects a limitation on R&L Carriers' right of subrogation 
guaranteed by Idaho Code§ 72-223; (2) whether the characterization ofthe recovery as among 
Claimant, his wife, and the third parties is binding on R&L Carriers; and (3) whether workers' 
compensation benefits are community property and, if so, whether a recovery for loss of 
consortium is also community property. 
Idaho Code § 72-223 provides, in pertinent part: 
If the amount recovered from the third party exceeds the amount of the subrogated 
portion payable to the employer for past compensation benefits paid, then to the 
extent the employer has a future subrogated interest in that portion of the third party 
recovery paid to the employee, the employer shall receive a credit against its future 
liability for compensation benefits. 
I. C. § 72-223(5). "The dual purposes of subrogation under I. C. § 72-223 are to achieve an 
equitable distribution between responsible parties 'by assuring that the discharge of an obligation 
be paid by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it' and 'to prevent the 
injured claimant from obtaining a double recovery for an injury."' Struhs v. Protection Techs., 
Inc., 133 Idaho 715,719,992 P.2d 164, 168 (1999) (quoting Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho 1, 3, 
740 P.2d 43, 45 (1987)). "The plain wording ofthe statute entitles employers to benefit from 
third party recoveries to the extent of their compensation liability, whether the employer has 
already paid the compensation or the compensation liability remains to be paid in the future." 
Cameron v. Minidoka County Highway Dist., 125 Idaho 801, 803, 874 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1994). 
In Cameron, the Court found it was undisputed that the claimants' recovery from the third party 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
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"not only reimbursed the surety for the compensation benefits already paid to the claimants, it 
also extinguished all of the surety's liability to pay future compensation." Id. 
First, the Commission should determine the potential effect of the Release of All Claims 
and Indemnity Agreement on R&L Carrier's right of subrogation. (See Ex. B.) In the Release, 
Claimant and his wife appear to have agreed to satisfY all subrogated interests. (/d.) The 
Commission's determination as to the effect of that Release will significantly impact R&L 
Carriers' right of subrogation. 
Second, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "an employee and third party's unilateral 
actions cannot restrict an employer's subrogation rights." Struhs, 133 Idaho at 721, 992 P.2d at 
170. In Struhs, the settlement characterized the claimant's recovery as "general damages." Id. 
The Court found that "[ e ]mployers have a statutory right to subrogation, and any characterization 
of damages to which the employer is not privy cannot change the employer's statutory rights." 
Id. A question then exists as to whether the letter of D. Scott Summer, and/or the Release, 
unilaterally restricts R&L Carriers' subrogation rights. These are novel and potentially complex 
questions of law. 
Finally, whether workers' compensation benefits are community property and, if so, 
whether proceeds of settlement ostensibly obtained for loss of consortium would also be 
considered community property is an issue of first impression in Idaho which will require an 
adjudication by the full Commission. J.R.P. 8(C)(l)(h). In Cook v. Cook, 102 Idaho 651, 637 
P.2d 799 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "It is a basic concept of community property 
law that all property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property. The same 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
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is true in the case of workmen's compensation benefits, particularly since it is unforeseeable if or 
when a marriage will end in divorce." 102 Idaho at 654, 63 7 P .2d at 802. The Court also stated 
that the "dispositive question in classifying work[er's] compensation benefits as community or 
separate property, therefore, is not whether the right to receive benefits vested during marriage, 
but rather to what extent the award compensates for loss of earning capacity during marriage." 
!d. In analyzing I. C. § 32-903 1, the Court concluded that property acquired during marriage as 
compensation for a right personal to an injured spouse alone is the separate property of the 
injured spouse. !d. 
Research has identified no case law in Idaho regarding whether proceeds recovered for a 
loss of consortium claim can be excluded from community property. In Idaho, loss of 
consortium is considered "a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a third party's 
tortious injury to a spouse." Jeremiah v. Yanke }vfach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 
992, 999 (1998) (quoting Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prods., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 394, 690 P.2d 
324, 329 (1984)). The Idaho Supreme Court has held "that a wife's claim for loss of consortium 
against a direct employer, because of its derivative nature, is barred by the exclusive remedies 
required by the workmen's compensation statutes." Runcorn, 107 Idaho at 394, 690 P.2d at 329 
(citing Coddington v. City of Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135,525 P.2d 330 (1974)). The Court of 
Appeals has further stated that an insurer's liability for a loss of consortium claim is included 
1 Idaho Code§ 32-903 states: "All property of either the husband or the wife owned by 
him or her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by either by [sic] gift, bequest, devise or 
descent, or that which either he or she shall acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate 
property, by way of moneys or other property, shall remain his or her sole and separate property." 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
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within the policy limits of liability to the injured spouse. Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 123, 
730 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Ct. App. 1986). However, no authority has been found addressing whether 
proceeds of settlement for loss of consortium would be considered community property in the 
workers' compensation setting, and other jurisdictions are split on the question. 
Bifurcation is appropriate, as an initial resolution of the subrogation issue will simplify 
any subsequent hearing on Claimant's workers' compensation benefits claim and may obviate the 
need for a hearing. Such a resolution also stands to contribute to the likelihood of settlement of 
the other issues pending in the underlying claim, thereby materially advancing the resolution of 
this matter. Therefore, R&L Carriers requests a stay of proceedings on Claimant's workers' 
compensation benefits claim until the full Commission has resolved the subrogation issue. 
Furthermore, as this is a case of first impression and involves novel and/or complex 
issues of law and potentially of fact, R&L Carriers requests adjudication by the full Commission 
of the subrogation issues. J.R.P. 8(C)(l )(h). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, R&L Carriers respectfully requests that the Commission enter 
an order bifurcating the subrogation issues from Claimant's workers' compensation benefits 
claim, and staying proceedings on the workers' compensation benefits claim pending resolution 
of the subrogation issues. R&L Carriers further requests a full Commission hearing on the 
subrogation issues. 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY PROCEEDINGS FOR 
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DATED this...2. { day of March, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,:2( day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: /\ 
-X-U.~~/ ) Richard Owen 
RICHARD OWEN LAW OFFICE 
206 12th A venue Road 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
/Han Der erf 
7 F;tral ,{%fess 
/ csinrll ransmission 
/ -- / 
/' /// 
/ ./ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth Avenue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 
ORIGINAL 





























TO: DEFENDANTS and their attorneys of record: 
I. C. No. 2008-011032 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANTS' INTERROGATORIES 
TO CLAIMANT 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state the name, address and telephone number of each 
and everypersonlmown to you who has any knowledge of, or who purports to have anylmowledge 
of, any of the facts of this case. By this Interrogatory, we seek the names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of all witnesses, or potential witnesses who have any knowledge of any facts pe1tinent to 
both damages and liability, and details as to their knowledge. 
CLAIMAl"{T'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAil\1ANT -- PG. 1 
EXHIBIT A 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.1: 
Claimant and Sophia Izaguirre 
3 517 Hennosa Ave. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Jimmy L. Crossland 
14834 Radar Hills Dr. 
Box Elder, SD 57719 
Darrell & Lola Lankford 
2184 Wildwood 
Emmett, Idaho 83617 
208-250-4749 
Wayne James 
1894 SE Sedgwick #104 
Port Orchard, W A 98366 
Corporal J olm McMahon 
Department fo Public Safety 
Utah Highway Patrol 
20 West 700 North 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Dr. Harold K. Thompson .I 
West Valley Medical Center 
1717 Arlington Ave. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Dr. Kevin Chicoine 
St. Al's Medical Group ,; 
315 E. Elm, Ste. 100 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Inte1motmtain Medical Imaging/ 
2929 E. Magic View Dr. 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAIMANT-- PG. 2 
Dr. William Lindner 
Dr. MarkS. Williams/ 
6500 Emerald St. 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Dr. Paul Collins 
1520 W. State Street, Ste. 220,..... 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Caldwell Physical Therapy 
1902 S. lOth Ave. / 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Peggy Wilson, PT, CEAS 
ST~S / 
901 N. Curtis Rd., Ste. 204 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Intennountain Physical Therapy / 
3110 E. Cleveland Blvd., Ste. AS 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Teresa Ballard 
847 Parkcentre Way, Ste. 7 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please state the names, addresses and telephone numbers of 
all persons you intend to call as witnesses at the hearing of this case. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.2: Any of the individuals listed in Intenogatory 
No. I, above may be called as a witness at the hearing of this case. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: With respect to the person you intend to call at the hearing of 
this case, please state as precisely as possible, the general nature of the facts to which each will 
testify. 
Al~SWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Claimant and his wife Sophia Izaguirre will 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDAL~TS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAllviANT -- PG. 3 
testify about his physical capabilities before and after the accident at issue herein. 
Jimmy L. Crossland was the other individual involved in the accident. 
Dru.rell & Lola Lankford and Wayne James witnessed the accident at issue herein and will 
testify to what they know. 
Corporal Jolm McMahon was the responding officer and will testify about his investigation 
and :findings. 
Claimant expects the doctors and physical therapists who have attended him since this 
accident to testify fi:om their medical records ru.1d will address topics such as the history given to 
them by Claimant herein, the medical examinations which they conducted and the results thereof, 
any diagnostic tests which they recommended, any treatment which they offered and Claimant's 
response thereto, any progress which the Claimant made as a result of the medical treatments 
rendered, Claimant's permanent impairment and/or permanent restrictions as a result of the injury 
complained of, and Claimant's long and short term prognoses. For further details regarding these 
opinions, please see the medical records being attached contemporaneously herewith. If further 
records are obtained which detail further record this Answer will be supplemented. 
Teressa Ballard will testify about the vocational assistance she provided to Claimant. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: If you, your attorneys or any person, firm or corporation acting 
on yom behalfhas consulted with or engaged any experts in connection with this litigation, set fmih 
from all facts pertaining to the experts including but not limited to the following: the name and 
address of each school or university where special education or training in tllis :field was received; 
and the dates of attendance at each school or university and the name or description of each degree 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAIM.AJ.~T -- PG. 4 
received including the date received and the name of the school from which received. 
As to any tests, analyses or examination conducted on any physical evidence relating to this 
litigation, please state on what dates they were conducted on any physical evidence relating to tllis 
litigation, please state on what dates they were conducted; the opinion of the expert or experts in 
detail including the conclusions and all information furnished to the expert and upon which his 
opillion was based. You may attach copies of any reports generated by the expert and matelial 
furnished to the expert in lieu of responding to this Inte1rogatory. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please see Interrogatory No. 1 and 3, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please set forth in detail what each witness to your accident 
observed. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please see Answer to Interrogatory No. 3, 
above. 
INTERROGATORY NO.6: Set forth each and every fact relating to the occurrence of your 
accident or occupational disease. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.6: I was driving on !84 in Snowville, Utah when 
another semi truck pulled out in front of me and hit my semi tmck causing it to rollover . 
. INTERROGATORY NO.7: Set f01ih each and every fact surrounding the notice of injury 
or occupational disease which you allege was given to your employer. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.7: I placed a call to the accident line as required 
by my employer, Caleb the dispatcher and then notified the ternlinal manager, Fred Maxwell. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: If you have earned money in any capacity as an employee, 
CLAIMANT'S Ai~SWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAIIVIAl~T -- PG. 5 
.:JtJ 
self-employed or other since your date of injury, all data pertaining to your employment including 
the name and address of the business where you were so employed or received earnings, the dates 
employed, eamings received and hourly, weekly or monthly rate of pay. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: I am currently employed with Old Dominion 
Freightline as a truck dliver. I started working part-time in July of 2009 and went full-time in 
March, 2010. I am paid .489 per mile. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: If you have applied for employment with any individual, 
business or agency, or have filed fonmemployment insurance compensation since the date of injury, 
set forth all facts pertaining to your application including the name and address of such individual, 
business agency or govemmental agency, and the dates when you filed application for employment 
or unemployment, and if you have received unemployment, the dates during which unemployment 
was received. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: I applied with Estes Saia and Fed Ex. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Ifyou have traveled outside the state of Idaho since your 
injmy, please set forth all facts and circumstances surrotmding each trip. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: I travel outside the State ofidaho to Oregon, 
Washington and Utah for my employment. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Set forth in detail any and all injuries you claim to have 
occuned as a result of the injury or occupational disease alleged in your Application for Heming. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: I injured my neck and left knee. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Set forth the names m1d addresses of all providers ofhealth 
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care, including hospitals, doctors, and chiropractors, from whom you have sought treatment for any 
reason, including the injury, since the date of injury. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please see Answer to futerrogatory No. 1, 
above for accident related treating physicians and therapists. 
fu addition, 
INTERROGATORY NO.l3: Set forth the names and addresses of all providers ofhealth 
care, including hospitals, doctors, and chiropractors, from whom you have sought treatment for any 
major accidents or illnesses from the date of birth until the date of the accident which is the subject 
matter of this litigation. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: 
fu 1995 I treated with Dr. Sid Garber, West Valley Medical Center, Dr. George Nicola, Dr. 
Betty Ball, Dr. Joe McCary and West Valley Physical Therapy for a low back and shoulder strain 
sustained while working for Larson Trucking when I was climbing down the ladder of a tanker and 
slipped and fell. 
fu 1996 I treated with West Valley Medical Center for epigastric pain. 
fu 1998 I treated with Dr. George Nicola and West Valley Medical Center for a left lmee 
injury I sustained at a Mexican Restaurant in Utah when a heavy chair fell against my lmee. 
In 1999 I treated with West Valley Medical Center for right flank pain. 
In 2000 I treated with West Valley Medical Center for right flank pain. 
In 2002 I treated with Dr. Ben Terry at Saltzer QuickCare when I was carrying meat and 
some bone went through my leather gloves into my right middle finger while employed with 
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I:tmovative Data Solutions, LTD. 
It1 2002 I treated with West Valley Medical Center and Dr. Kevin Chicoine while working 
for I:tmovative Data Solutions, LTD when an employee of Con Agra sprayed the inside of my truck 
cab with a toxic chemical. 
It1 August 2004 I treated with Saltzer Quickcare, Dr. Ben Terry and Dr. Miers Johnson for 
an injmy to my right shoulder and cervical strain while working for I:tmovative Data Solutions, LTD 
when I was throwing bone into a trailer. 
In 2004 I treated at West Valley Medical Center for a laceration to my left 2nd digit. 
It12007 I treated at West Valley Medical Center for left flank pain. 
INTERROGATORYN0.14: Setforththenames andaddressesofallemployers for whom 
you have worked, including self-employment, prior to the injury or occupational disease which is 
the subject matter of this litigation. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: I have been employed with the following: 
From 2006 through 2009 I was employed with R&L Carriers as a combo driver. My rate of 
pay varied according to the line driven and additional work available. 
In 2006 I was employed with DATS Trucking as a truck driver. I earned approximately 
$14.00 an hour. 
I:t1 2005 I was employed with Motor West as a truck driver. I earned approximately .28 a 
mile. 
In 2005 I was employed with Asphalt Alliance as a truckdriver. I earned approximately .3 5 
a mile. 
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From 2000 through 2005 I was employed with Innovative Data Solutions (Kar Services) as 
a truck driver. I earned approximately $13.50 an hour. 
I have been driving truck and have had my CDL for approximately 23 years and have worked 
for various tmcking companies. 
From 1997 through 1999 I was employed with Woodgrain Millwork as a laborer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If you have ever been a member ofthe Armed Forces of the 
United States or any other cOtmtry, set forth the pertinent information as to your military service, i.e., 
the branch of service, inclusive dates of service and your military service number. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15: I have not been a member of the armed 
forces. 
INTERROGATORYN0.16:Setforth the residence addresses for each and everyplace you 
have lived since the date of injury or occupational disease which is the subject matter of this 
litigation. 
fu~SWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16: I have resided at 3517 Hermosa Ave., 
Caldwell, Idaho since the date of my injury. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Set forth each and every name or alias you have used since 
your date of birth through the present and the dates thereof. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: I have gone by Rubio Izaguine, Rubio 
Izaguine, Sr. and Rubio Izaguirre Mendoza. 
INTERROGATORY NO.l8: If you claim to have sustained any permanent impairment 
or disability as a result ofthe injury which is the subject matter of this proceeding, please set forth 
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the name ofthe physician or other provider of health care who has so stated. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Dr. Mark Williams issued me a 5% whole 
person impainnent rating. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Set forth in detail the nature and extent of your fonnal 
education, vocational training or other educational and training backgrOtmd relative to your 
employability. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19: I grew up in Mexico and never attended 
school. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Set forth the amount and source of your earnings for a period 
of one year preceding the date of injury which is the subject matter of this litigation. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20: This information has been requested and this 
Answer will be supplemented. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Ifyou have sustained any major injury or ilh1ess since the 
date of your accident or occupational disease which is the subject matter of this proceeding, set forth 
in detail all facts and circumstances surrounding such illness or injury. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: If you have sustained any major injury or illness prior to the 
date of your accident or occupational disease which is the subject matter ofthis proceeding, set forth 
in detail all facts and circumstances surrounding such illness or injury. 
Ac~SWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Please see Answer to Interrogatory No. 13, 
above. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 23: If you have received a settlement, commenced litigation or 
made claim in any mrumer for any injuries or illnesses which you have sustained throughout your 
life, regardless of whether such claim preceded or followed the injmy or occupational disease which 
is the subject matter of this litigation, please set forth all the details and circumstances surrounding 
such settlement, litigation or claim. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23: Please see attached records from the Idaho 
Industrial Commission. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Set fmih in detail the nature of the complaints from which 
you suffer on the date of signing your answers to these h1ten·ogatories and which you allege to be 
the result of the injury or occupational disease which is the subject matter of this litigation. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24: I am unable to lift, bend and squat I have 
no strength in my knee and have trouble with it locking up on me when I sit in the same position for 
a long period of time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: If you have ever been given an impairment rating or 
disability rating relative to any birth defect, injury or illness, regardless of whether it preceded or 
followed the injury or occupational disease which is the subject matter ofthis litigation, please set 
forth all details pertaining to the impairment rating, including the condition for which it was given, 
the source of the rating, i.e. physician who gave it, and the amount of the rating? 
A.i~SWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25: I was given a 5% whole person impainnent 
rating by Dr. Sid Garber for my December, 1995 injury to my left lmee. 
I was given a 1% whole person impairment for my August, 2004 injury to my right shoulder. 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDA.i~TS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAil\tiANT -- PG. 11 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: If you have any birth defect or have you had any illness or 
injury, regardless of whether such illnesses or injuries preceded or followed the accident or 
occupational disease which is the subject matter of tlus litigation, which you deem to be of a 
permanent nature, whether or not any physician or provider ofhealth care has expressed m1y opinion 
about such birth defect, illness or injmy, please set forth all factors peiiaining to such conditions 
including those physicians who have treated you for it, and rendered any opinions pertaining to the 
pe1manency of the condition? 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Please see Answer to Inte1rogatory No. 25, 
above. 
INTERROGATORYN0.27:Ifanyofyourmedicalexpensesortimelosswhichyouclaim 
to be caused by an industrial accident has been paid by an accident and health carrier, or by m1y other 
person or entity other than the Defendant employer or surety, please set forth all facts surrOlmding 
the payment including the following: The name, address and phone number of the surety, person or 
entity making such payment; whether or not such smety, person or entity has subrogation rights, 
nmne, address and phone number ofthe health care provider paid; the amount paid to the health care 
provider; and iftime loss or disability payments were made, the mnount of payments and the time 
for which payments were made. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27: None at this time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: If you claim to have incurred temporary total disability in 
addition to that previously paid, please set forth all facts pertaining to it including the dates during 
which you claim such disability, and the name, address and phone number of the physician who 
CLAIMANT'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANTS' 
INTERROGATORIES TO CLAIMANT-- PG. 12 
87 
supports your claim for disability. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Unlmown at tilis time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Ifyouclaimmedicalexpensesinaddition to those previously 
paid, please set forth all pertinent data pertaining to the expense including the name, address and 
phone number ofthe provider ofhealt11 care, the dates the services were provided, ti1e amm.mt of the 
bill incuiTed, and ti1e reason for the treatment for which the expense was rendered. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29: I contend that I am entitled to the surgery 
which Dr. William Lindner recommended in March of 2009. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: If you claiming an unreasonable denial of benefits and 
attorney fees therefore pursuant to I.C. Section 72-804, please set forth each and every fact 
supporting your claim. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 30: I am not claiming attorney fees at tllis time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 31: Set forth the dates when counsel for Claimant, or any 
representatives on behalf of counsel for Claimant have had communications, written or oral, with 
any of Claimant's treating physicians. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 31: Please see attached medical request letters. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 32: If you are subject to any Order for Cllild Support for which 
a lien might be filed by any state agency upon any revenues due you from the employer, please state 
all facts and circumstances SlilTolmding the Child Support Order, including but not limited to the 
state in which the Order was entered, the Court in which the Order was entered, the amount of the 
payments, the payee of the payments, and any other pe1iinent infonnation. 
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 32: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: If you have proceeding pending, or a claim pending against 
any other employer, or any other individual, for any physical condition which you allege causes you 
disability or restriction, set forth the name and address of the parties, the tribunal in which it is 
pending, and it cmTent status. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 33: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 34: Set forth the date(s) of any Social Secmity Disability 
application(s) and the outcome or status thereof. 
ANSWER TO ll~TERROGATORY NO. 34: I have not applied for Social Security 
Disability. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 35: If you have applied for Social Security Disability and been 
denied, do you plan to appeal or reapply? 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 35: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 36: Are you eligible for Medicare benefits? 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 36: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 37: If you are not cuiTently eligible for Medicare benefits, do you 
anticipate being eligible for Medicare benefits within the next 30 months? 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 37: No. 
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DATED TI1is M day ofDecember, 2010. 
Rubio Izaguirre, Claimant 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
On this I (jtD day of December, 2010, before me a Notary Public in and for said State, 
personally appeared RUBIO IZAGUIRRE, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed 
in the above and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this 
certificate first above written. 
~\\\\\IIIII II IIIII 
~'''l~i.\ P ERDt./!1/~ 
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~ .. .. ~ :.::: .n•• .•,J.Q '§o 
~u?'flr,•••••••f..~· ~ "''1. '"~ £ OF \v \''" ~llllllfllll\\\\\'1 
REVIEWED AND APPROVED This lk_ day of December, 2010. 
By=-----+~-"""-:;.._::_---"~:::....::~'----­
Richard S. Owen 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this__!&_ day ofDecember, 2010, a tme and correct copy of 
the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Postage prepaid, to: 
Alan R. Gardner 
P.O. Box 2528 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
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Rl!:LEAS:E OF ALL CLAIMS AND. INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
The und~:rsig11.ed, RUBIO S, JZAGU.UUU: .SR. and .JlJANA SOFIA 
lZA.GUJRRE, .individually, and. as :husband ·and wJfe, for the sule eonsi9er~pon .of'l'WO 
'HUN.U~J) THOUSAND AND .00/100 DOLLARS {S20.0,000.06)7 r~ceipt of w~icb is 
hereby ·acknowledged, dO hereby on be~J;f of ~Mms~Jv~. and for th~ h~irs? ~~ep~tor~ 
admi~istr41tors, suecessors, esJ~t~. ~P~$~tativel, assigns, em.t>lor~~s ·9r ~ge.n~, lf a_ny~ 
.~d·· ~PY ~4 -~ p~rs.o.ns .Qr ~11ti:ties wllo. may h~ve -~ ip~er~st 'l)ew~~ (here,inafjer 
lpdiYJ~U:ally ~d :colle;ctiv.e)y r:efen:ed to. ~ "Rcl~on")~ .rel~~~~ acquit and forev.er-
.di~~barge A.Mna·CO ·CA.RllllmS, Ir{C., ,a 'Ne"br•sk.'l C:Orpo:ra&,n, and JIMMY L. 
~.OS$tA.~, lndividually and as IUl employee- of Anleri..Co Cani~G.. ·Inc., IUld each 
an~ alJ r;Jf th~ir r~pective ageu~t :ernploy.e~s. princ.ipal~l offwe~ l)lernbers-, shareholders, 
~nt .<iorppl:ati~ns, subsidiaries, ~.ccS$ors, dir~tots, assisns. and instnttsr b.to.lu:~na 
P'"l not llntitt~d to .BARCO NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, (hete.inafttr 
il}dividu~Il, and eolle.~'tively ,referred to .aa '~Releasees~~) of and tiOl'n any and :all :cl~ims,. 
aciio~, .c:a-uscs of acti9n, d~;lltatt$., rights, damages, .costs; .los~ of s~rvic~, expen~e-, 
attorney fees .and CO!l'JP~P.S~Ol\ whf!tsoc.ver whic~ .the ·Rcle~!Jrs. .now :~ve Ql.: wW~h tnaY · 
hereafter ac®e on acco~ e>f or in ·any w.y ~rtafnint t& :any ~.d ftll if\iun~s. itnd 
damage. .and the eonsequ~~$ th~~f, resiil#ng. !lrising tro~ .9~ which alleg~ly have 
arisen &om that certain ac:~i.d~:t. ~~~Jlty Qr ,,-ve~ ~eh o~~d on Interstat~ 84 i~ 
)~Qx Eld.er County, Ut~, ~n Qr .about F~bnllll')t i·s, ·:wos. wh~~~i.n ~ v.~hjQJe owne4 by 
AJneri .. ca and ~P~~ed p)' Jimmy.4. Crosslan.d.·c~lli~ wbh a v.ebiQle 9p~ra~dby·Rubi9 
.s. IzagUirre. .causing i~j'uri~' .~d an..~g~4 ~amagcs tQ Relea$~~ . · 
. As further ~pnskfen\tlon for this Release of All Cl;Usns and lndemnity.Agreement,. 
RcleasQ~ Prornis~ ~d co:vtmfU.lt jo sa~t}t and pay amy .and all -medieaJ .provid~ li~ 
holders. lrisur~. an!i ~ubrqgat!'~ interQs~ .PJ' .righb of any per$0~ <ron1pany or .entity 
which has; or m.~y !:II~ 1.rlgbt ·to .rehnl:nJtSeJ1l~nt :or p.ayment for: any medical treatment. 
d'~ili~,. or prop_e~ _C(a:qlag~~ or danli\gc. of any kind .ofReleasors arising ·fr~ .9r·caused 
by the ·accident or txl~dcnt de~r.ibcd he.re~ including but not limited 1o fhe ld.~() Sbrte 
lnsqraQqo . f'uncl .()X: any other worker"s compensation, .and R~l~so~ fWU\er ag{ee tQ 
.inde.r;nnjfy, _qef~nd, and hold .Release.es .harmless ~~~list allY ~d slJ ·$_tJ(ib (;laiJJl$, lO.$St 
d&ln,~.ge OJ; eXpens(', including .CO$tl and feas9na~l:e ~tt~ey f~e~ w4i<:b. Ir.a:r .be asserted 
~~in.st !)r 'incurred by Releasees if Rele~sors .faiJ t9 satj;sfy ~d ~r p,r:oyiders ·QF 
sub.ro.g~~ed ·iWe~~ts ~promised 'herein. 
~s .tte:lease of All q~ipJs and J:n~~l11JliU' Agreement lJ ~ aU resp~ets intended to 
~d .sh~JU bet -construed to .be a .general te~~liS~,of all ~•11Im$ Qf.&eleasors .against Re1e!!li~es 
arisiJlg from th~ .accident or ln.<?iqenf ~es~n'b~ ·her.ein. lt i$ ttttended and shall be a full 
.und final release i1lld .~i~cbarge ,of .R~lea~~e~. regardl.es$ of any injury. damage 9r riSht, 
·wbother known:or lltlkno)Vn. .bY ~Je~prs. .. · · · 
This Release of A~l Cl~i~s and fnd~n:ulity Agreement i~ ent~red .into v.oJqntarily 
by ,!\eleasors wi{h a 1411 ~der$tCJnding Qf.any lind tdl claims, tights, fnj~e$ Qf damag~ 








incidents desc~ihe.d above. Releasors hereby declarf. ·~an~ reptese.nt that th~ ~aa:s 
allegedly sust~me9 are or mat be permanent and pro~ss~ve .and recovery therefrom ts 
uncertain and in~efinilet ~~ in makip,g this J~lease .~~ ~ntetipg int~ this .a_~~em~~t •• it is 
tmdet.$tPod .and ~gr.eed that ~leas()~ tely whQUy .'!:lp.~ Re.leas9rs.'Judgme.nt, ·bebet·and 
knowledge ·of the nature. ext~nt a11d d\lr~tion Of saf~ alleged da.l\'ta~$', an~ is m@.~e 
Without reliance upon any statel.!lent or represen,ation of the Releasees qr lll~r 
representative$. ReJ~asoJ;S b~v!' consl.,lhed wilb theit at.tcml~ys •. nam~y l), .Scpn :Summer.. 
·in ·aH m~t~ri.al ~,spec.ts !CS~n~ ~c .se~le~e~t pf Recas9~, ~laims .~4 thi~ Relea~e of 
All Claims ~41nd¢m~•ty Agre~en~. 
'fbi.~ .se.t1lemc;n~ is a com:pronli~ of a dQq~ . and dispu,ted claim, .and the 
paym~~t -made ·is ·not tQ be oonstruc:d as an achttis.,on of liability by Releas.ees,. and 
Ref~asees deny liability there. fore and intend metel. ·to awid litigation and bU1 their-
~aQe. · 
. . 
No promise; inducement or agreement not hFin expressed has ·been made .to 
R.ele.asors and this :Rel~ase of AU Claim$. and I~4~mlrity Agree~~t oont®ls th~ en til¥ 
agte~ement between tho parties hereto, and the 'terms ff t?iS ·Rei~~ ~ contr.~ctual ~d 
not mere recitals. ·This Release of AJ} Claims ctil~ Jnd~tr..Apceql~t .a ~nte.;~q iQto ~· . 
the State of Idaho and shall be- construed in. ~QCordaDCCJ w.i~ its l~w~ •. lbis ~~~~~e .o{ AU 
ClaimS .and .Indemnity Agrc>~~e~t $.hall ,b~ valid in all Sta~~7 including but not lunited to, · 
the State of"Idaho \104 t~,~~ ofQt~. · · 
. . 
· Rele~se~ ~ree.1o .p~y·the mediawr~s fee. ~r- ~~e meq~n :cQJ.lQ\lOted .on OC.tober 
:15, 2tl09. 










A ) ·S$. 
Q)umy.ofl4 .,.,~ ) 
.~?Q09,, 
R.ELltASOR; 
RUBtO S. IZAGUIRRE SR. 
. On thjs ~ay of October, ~009, before ·me, .the ·undersig.ned» a 1\Qtary public in 
.~d for ~i4 Wl.lf.l~ and •te.. .J*JOPl8lly appeared ~VBlO S .. IZAGUIRRE .SR., known 
or i!fentiti~~ ~ rne ~O: b!= ·~~ p~on wllQse Jlame is subscribed to ~-within instr:um~t,. 
~d; =!!Cknowl~~C!d. tp me .that he exeQute.d the ·same. 
. . 
IN WITNB~S Wl'IEREOF. l hltVe htJtetmto set my 4and and affixed my official 
$~ the day !Uld ye!'P' in this .certifioat~ first above =writt · 
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·STATB .OF IDAHO ) 
¢ounvQfW ~ ... 
,,~-~)· 
-· ., . . ~: 
On this 1-'~day 9f.Octo.b~;r, 009., b~fQre ·met the un~~~d, a ~Qttro' public ,fn 
and for said. county and state, p : ooaJJy .appeared JUANA SQFIA iZAG:VUl~, 
known or identified to m~ to. .be t e -~rsen whose name is :Bubs.erlbed to th" ·within 
ins,tr.ument, aad a~kn.owledged to that she exe.cuted tbe same, 
....,~....,."'"" ~uniJn~r 
· AttQl)ley·fur Rele~o.-~ 
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SCO·TT SUMMER, 'iitLC. 
.PAGE: 1:11102 
~~~9 -~ir.re, Sr. 
1~~ ~ofia tz.&P"irte 
3:St1·f.r~!Ja A, ve: 
,catdW.CJl. 1D 836os .:: ' .. 
A 'I' 1·0 "II• N I Y A .'f ·f, ~ 'lr 
.•~2 3 SPJH~t('J' .!\.VB. •• SUI'J.""Il ·~. 
CALDWEU •• IPAH.O 83&0$ ...... 
• P t;> JH);::( :1:0 9':; 
C,.ll.lDW'Iit.,L,, lD S)ES06 
"*" 
·tBt"'fPHONll: 2 0.8.4$ S.,a.s.o.~ 
.P.t\~SIMlLB:. 206,4 S·, •. IJ.6.9f 
November 13~ 20Q9 
;tte: ~ettt.,.ent of your p~llQn:al·injuey and loss of coosO.tium elai~, and los$ of 
~$ottium d~ms, ~ever, )'Ori1' .Work~'·~ Cottlpensat;OJt. Cltlims. H~ 'Rfght$lJJT'QJJgfo.! 
Te'mJTnalion &.poSs.lk wroilgfi.ll rknitil t.fdisabll~ benqils ck:mns ~ ~,. 
Dear~. end:Mr~ ~~: . 
·. At yo~ rem,test, we )lav~ settled your p~oo:al 'iojbr.y 'c.laim and l~s~ .of :eQ~ortlum ~l~.m . 
for·& tolal Qf$~00,.00~, wid}. $1-{X),OO(),oO attributed.to-.RubiJ) and $100;QQO.O() a.ttribv.table to 
·S~~fQ.: her loss Qf"conso~ claims. the sigmna·Ofthis r~teas.e ~s, once:an4.t.or all, -~Y 
c;:XaimJ either «;JfYQli mayb.•ve had gainst Amei-Co Qrrier:IJ,.Jit,nUW L. Cr0.ssland .a~d/or·any of 
it$/bis {nsq(~C$ for this ~se of actjf)n. However, as noted.abo've, your Wqrk~s Compen~ti.on. 
Hu.~g ltigb.ts,. Wt:Qng!Ul Ter.~i~~ art<J po~i\)1~ wronaful denial of disability b.en.efita claims . 
. re~ain Q_pe.n. · 
The !Vllqwins:rep~ .. ~\reco~a.tion Qf~ tos.ts.. and other oistributiOn!, 
.~ently to be.~~ in lrQSt untiJ the f'in..r l:l~YQUta are:deter.mlned, in accordan~ mlh. th& .· 
. .AttQtoe,/CU•:CQntmcr ~.intP ,t>etween -~~cu-." .and "Attorney;" All.«h.er ®disputed. . 
mopie~ :~to be tU~tri~ut;~d tQ ·~ ~nd .eacJl of')lOU at this time... . · 
TOT.At GR0$8 A~Am s.B1U.BMENT:- ...................... , ..... $ · 200~000-~Q 
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I. C. No. 2008-011032 
CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR STAY 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby files this 
Memorandum Brief in Opposition of the Defendants' Motion for Stay and its Motion to determine 
a novel issue of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants have accurately set out the status of the case at this point. Claimant had a third 
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party case which was settled by a previous attorney of record and the monies disbursed. As set forth 
in the Exhibits A and B to the Defendants' Memorandum Brief, the Claimant and his wife settled 
his case as against the adverse third party carrier for a total of $200,000.00. This settlement was 
attributed to both the husband and wife; the wife asserting a claim for loss of consortium. 
The Defendants now seek to characterize that settlement as one against which they can 
exercise their subrogated rights, regardless of the nature of their recovery or the fact that the 
Claimant's wife was entitled to at least part of that recovery. 
Secondly, the Defendants evidentially request that the Industrial Commission go behind 
settlement documents as between Claimant, his wife, and the third party to attribute the settlement 
achieved by the Claimant from the third party in a manner more favorable to Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Some of the Settlement is the Wife's Separate Property 
Defendants cite to the case of Cook v. Cook, 102 Idaho 651, 637 P.2d 799 (1981), for the 
proposition that benefits obtained through a worker's compensation case are presumed to be 
community property. 
Unfortunately, the citation of this case and its legal proposition do not assist the Industrial 
Commission herein. At issue in this case are not benefits which were obtained through a worker's 
compensation case; at issue herein are benefits obtained in a personal injury recovery. The 
characterization of these benefits depends upon the nature of their recovery and the basis for that 
recovery. In the seminal case of Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company, 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 
(197 4), the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned with the thorny issue of whether or not a wife could 
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maintain a lawsuit against the husband for negligence. The Court found that the determination of 
this issue rested on at least in part, on whether or not the recovery would be community property and 
how that law affected the wife's ability to recover as against the husband. 
After deciding that there was no public policy reason to prevent a wife from maintaining a 
cause of action for negligence against the husband in the context of the case, (automobile accident), 
the Court continued by noting that the wife's recovery would be partially community property and 
partially her own separate property depending upon the nature of the recovery obtained. 
It is our conclusion that the Washington Supreme Court has 
established a workable rule concerning damages in this type of case, 
an action for personal injuries sustained by the wife. Therefore it is 
the conclusion of this court that appellant in this action is entitled to 
pursue her remedy for damages arising out of the accident alleged 
notwithstanding that she has named her husband as a party defendant. 
Appellant seeks recovery of special damages, including established 
future specials. She also seeks general damages for loss of future 
earnings and also general damages as compensation for pain and 
suffering. Appellant is entitled to recover her special damage, 
including established future specials, as these are actual out of pocket 
expenses which are a community liability. And the fact her spouse 
would be relieved of his financial burden is outweighed by the fact 
such damages are strictly compensatory in nature inuring to the 
benefit of the injured spouse. General damages for loss of future 
earnings which would be community property would be recoverable 
only in the fraction of one-half as the separate property of the injured 
spouse, and general damages for pain and suffering and emotional 
distress would be fully recoverable as the injured spouse's separate 
property. 
(See, Rogers, supra, at 539 P.2d 572) (Emphasis Added) 
In Cook v. Cook, supra, the Supreme Court noted that the classification of property as 
separate or community depends upon whether or not the right to be vindicated is personal to one 
spouse alone or whether or not the right to be vindicated is payable from community proceeds or as 
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a community liability. 
The classification of property as separate or community is controlled 
initially by I. C. Section 39-903 and Section 39-906. Applying those 
sections, the Plaintiff argues that when a right to receive worker's 
compensation becomes vested due to the occurrence of a work-related 
injury during marriage, the right to benefits is wholly community 
property because it is "property acquired after marriage," but not 
acquired by "gift, bequest, devise or decent ... or with the proceeds of 
separate property." However such an argument places to strict a 
construction upon the word "acquired." Where property. or the right 
to receive property, is acquired during marriage as compensation for 
some right personal to one spouse alone. that property takes its 
character from the right violated and is a separate property of that 
injured spouse. Jurek v. Jurek 124 Ariz. 596, 606 P.2d 812, 818 
(1980); Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co., v. Boyd, 102 P.2d 627, 
629 (Nev. 1940). This Court has recently recognized that rule by 
holding the pain and suffering component of a tort recovery for a 
personal injury to be the separate property of the injured spouse. 
Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., supra. By the same token, the 
"acquired" should not be read over broadly to require that every 
award of workman's compensation be deemed community property 
in total simply because the injury upon which the benefits are 
premised occurred during marriage. 
(See, Cook, supra at 637 P.2d at 653.) (Emphasis Added) 
Claimant in this case contends that even though the right to make a claim for loss of 
consortium is a derivative claim and flows from the fact of the injury to Claimant in this matter, 
Claimant contends that the recovery of his wife in this third party settlement is the property of his 
wife because it is based upon the wife's loss of services, society, companionship and other elements 
of the marital relationship suffered personally by the wife as a result of the injury to the Claimant. 
Under the holding of Rogers v. Yellowstone, supra, and Cook v. Cook, supra, Claimant 
contends that a loss of consortium recovery such as that obtained by the wife in this case is separate 
property and beyond the reach of any subrogated interest of the Surety herein. 
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In addition, Claimant contends that other elements ofthe settlement achieved by the Claimant 
and his wife in this matter may be partially beyond the reach of the subrogated interest of the 
Defendant Surety in this matter. Under the rationale of the Yellowstone case, supra, if the 
Claimant's settlement includes a recovery for future loss of earnings, future medical expense, and 
future pain and suffering or other benefits which may be classified as community property, belonging 
half to the Claimant and half to the Claimant's wife, then Claimant contends that these benefits may 
also be beyond the reach of the Surety herein as they are the property of the wife, at least partially. 
Claimant requests that the Industrial Commission allow Claimant additional briefing to fully 
outline the law in this matter if the Industrial Commission decides that it has the jurisdiction and the 
desire to delve into this issue more deeply. 
THE SCOPE OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS POWER TO INTERVENE 
Claimant has genuine and basic questions about the scope of authority of the Industrial 
Commission herein to intervene in this matter and make determinations about the extent of the 
Defendants' subrogated interest especially inasmuch as it involves inquires in to the attorney's fees 
charged by Claimant's previous attorney and, the extent of the subrogated interest in that part of 
Claimant's settlement which may constitute the separate property of Claimant's wife. 
1. Attornev's Fees 
As noted by an Exhibit attached to the Defendants' Brief, in the letter ofD. Scott Summer, 
Claimant's previous attorney, it appears that Claimant was charged an attorney's fee in the amount 
of$70,000.00 from the settlement achieved herein or an amount equal to thirty-five percent (35%) 
of the $200,000.00 settlement. Further, it appears that there is a dispute between Surety and 
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Claimant's previous attorney about whether or not Surety would honor this attorney's fee and would 
assume its proportionate share thereofpursuant to Idaho Code 72-223(4). 
Claimant contends that neither Surety nor the Industrial Commission has the jurisdiction to 
refuse to honor this fee and that this is a contractual matter between the Claimant and his previous 
attorney of record. 
It is to be remembered that the Industrial Commission previously attempted to become 
involved in an attorney's fee issue in a third party case as between a Claimant and the Claimant's 
attorney only to be informed by the Supreme Court that it had no jurisdiction to do so. In the sad 
case of Leanne Cheung v. Raymundo Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 137 P.3d 417 (2006), the Industrial 
Commission had intervened in a case between a Claimant and the Claimant's lawyer in a situation 
where the Claimant had a third party case and a worker's compensation case both handled by the 
same attorney. 
In the Industrial Commission's proceedings, the Industrial Commission found that the 
Claimant's attorney had overcharged the Claimant in the third party case and also in the worker's 
compensation case ordering the Claimant attorney to refund the Claimant a substantial amount of 
money. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission with regard to the 
attorney's fees charged in the worker's compensation case. However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
noted that the Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to force the Claimant's attorney to 
refund any monies charged in the third party case and reversed this part of the Industrial 
Commission's decision. The Supreme Court noted in support of this decision as follows: 
CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR STAY - PG. 6 
The Industrial Commission is empowered by statute to issue rules and 
regulations necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. (Citations omitted) .... As the Commission's 
authority is a creation of statute, the Commission "may only act 
pursuant to an enumerated power." Curr, 124 Idaho at 691, 864 P.2d 
at 317. The Industrial Commission's mandate over worker's 
compensation cases is limited to those claims brought by worker's 
compensation claimants against employers or an employer's surety. 
Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 134, 106 
P.3d 455, 460 (2005). 
In this case, the Industrial Commission, it is submitted, has no jurisdiction to relieve the 
Surety of accepting its proportionate share ofliability for the fee charged by the Claimant's previous 
attorney pursuant to I. C. 72-223. This calculation must be a part of the subrogated interest both past, 
present and future of Surety herein. In other words, Claimant contends that the thirty-five percent 
(3 5%) fee charged by Claimant's attorney below must be honored both in terms of repayment of the 
Surety of the subrogated interest which it possessed at the time of settlement and in relation to any 
future subrogated interest which the Industrial Commission may find in this case. 
2. The Extent of Claim for Claimant's Wife, Loss of Consortium 
As noted in Defendants' Brief, Defendants have noted that all of the recovery in this case is 
attributable to the Claimant itself and that even if the Industrial Commission herein qttributes part 
of that settlement to the wife of Claimant, all those proceeds are community property, thereby 
allowing Defendant to exercise its subrogated rights against the entire settlement achieved by 
Claimant and his wife. 
As noted in the prior section, Claimant contends that the wife's share of the settlement 
including her claim for loss of consortium, is her own separate property and is not something that 
can be attached, reached or taken away by the Defendant Surety as part of its subrogated rights. 
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If the fudustrial Commission agrees with this legal argument, then the fudustrial Commission 
is left with a question of whether or not the apportionment or attribution of the $200,000.00 
settlement made by Claimant's previous attorney as between Claimant and his wife is appropriate. 
As noted, Defendants claim that it is not appropriate. Claimant contends that it is appropriate. 
If the fudustrial Commission finds, as a matter oflaw, that the wife's separate property cannot 
be reached by Defendants through their subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code 72-223, then the 
Industrial Commission must decide how much of the settlement is factually and legally, the sole 
property of the wife herein. 
Claimant recognizes that prior fudustrial Commission cases have assumed jurisdiction to 
decide similar questions. In the case of Davis v. Wayne's Transmission, 94-881861, 1999 IIC 1014 
( 1999), the Industrial Commission was concerned about a third party settlement which had been 
settled without any determination as to whether or not the employer was comparatively liable. 
Based upon a dispute between the settling Claimant that the employer with regard to the 
employers degree of fault, the Industrial Commission received briefing and determined that because 
the determination of the comparative fault as between the employer and the employee involved the 
administration ofldaho Code 72-223, it would assume jurisdiction to determine the comparative 
fault issue. After reviewing a California case on point, the Industrial Commission determined that 
the Commission had jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-201, 72-211, 72-707, and 72-
223 to hear the alleged issue of alleged comparative fault of the Defendant employer under the facts 
of this case where that issue had not been resolved in the trial court and had not been agreed upon 
by the parties. (See, attached). 
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In view of this decision, Claimant assumes that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction 
to hear the issue of how much of Claimant's settlement should properly be apportioned to the wife 
as her sole and separate property and suggests that this issue be the subject of the Claimant's hearing 
now set to commence on June 3, 2011. 
Claimant contends that an evidentiary hearing on this issue is required so that the 
Commission or its designated Referee can hear evidence as to the extent of injuries suffered by the 
wife in this matter and to enable the finder of fact to make a decision about the extent of injury 
suffered by the wife and the value thereof in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED This~ day of April, 2011. 
By: ____ __,~---~--_;: 
RichardS. Owen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this± day of April, 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
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9/3/1999 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Davis, Kevin J. 
Wayne's Transmission 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
09/03/1999 
94-881861 - 1999 IIC 1014 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The Industrial Commission, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-506, assigned the above-entitled 
case to Referee Peggy McMahon who held a telephone conference on May 17, 1999, regarding 
procedural matters. Craig R. Jorgenson of Pocatello, Idaho, represented Claimant. James A. 
Ford of Boise, Idaho, represented Defendants Employer and Surety. Referee McMahon set the 
matter for hearing the week of October 4, 1999. Should the Commission assume jurisdiction on 
the questions relating to the issue of concurrent comparative negligence, that matter will be 
heard as well as the issues of the extent of impairment and disability benefits. However, Referee 
McMahon requested that the question of the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction over the 
issue of concurrent negligence be briefed prior to hearing. The final brief having been received 
on August 13, 1999, the matter is ready for decision. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND ISSUE 
Claimant contends and Defendants deny that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction as a 
"question arising under [workers' compensation] law" to hear the issue of alleged comparative 
negligence of Defendant Employer as against a third party and its related issues. That is the sole 
issue presented to the Commission at this time. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The evidence considered is the Commission's legal file in the above-entitled matter. After 
having fully considered the above evidence and the briefs of the parties, Referee Peggy 
McMahon submits the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for review by the 
Commission. 
Davis, Kevin J. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION- 1999 IIC 1014.1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
of the Idaho lnd ustrial Com mission 
199911C 1014.2 
9/3/1999 
1. Kevin Davis, Claimant, suffered various fractures in his spine and upper and lower 
extremities that allegedly arose out of and in the course ofhis employment with Wayne's 
Transmission on July 18, 1994, after a tire that he had inflated exploded. 
2. Claimant first filed a third-party action (K. Davis v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
CIV97-017-E-BLW) in the United States District Court, District ofldaho. 
3. Claimant next filed his Workers' Compensation Complaint on November 19, 1998, listing as 
an issue, "The employer/surety's entitlement to subrogation-reimbursement out of settlement 
proceeds from the third-party suit." According to the representations of counsel, the third party 
action was settled with the consent of Employer/Surety and the parties agreed that issues 
regarding subrogation and future workers' compensation benefits would be left open. Claimant's 
Reply Brief, p. 5. Because the issue of Employer's comparative negligence was not litigated in 
U.S. District Court, Claimant now requests that he be allowed to litigate that matter before the 
Commission. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred contrary to statute, even by stipulation or agreement of the 
parties. See, Knight v. Younkin et al., 61 Idaho 612, 105 P.2d 456 (1940); Banburyv. 
Brailsford, 66 Idaho 262, 158 P.2d 826 (1945). Thus, even though the parties may have agreed 
during the third-party action in federal court that the issues related to comparative negligence 
will be litigated before the Commission, such an agreement is not binding on the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has jurisdiction to determine whether it may exercise subject 
matter jurisdiction. See Brooks v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 1066, 793 P.2d 1238 (1990). 
Statutory and case law point to the Commission as the forum to exercise jurisdiction where the matter of 
comparative negligence has not been adjudicated in civil court. Idaho Code Section 72-201 1 and 
1 That section provides: 
72-201. Declaration of police pom!r. -- The common law system governing the remedy of Y~Vrkmen against 
employers for injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in industrial and public work is inconsistent 
with modern industrial conditions. The v.elfare of the state depends upon its industries and even more upoo the 
welfare of its 11uge workers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign pov.er, 
declares that all phases of the premises are wthdrawn from private controversy. and sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the 
exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to 
that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and alljurisdicrion of the courts of the 
state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this lawprovided. 
Davis, Kevin J. 
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72-21 P vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission over claims for injuries arising 
out of and in the course of employment. Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 715 P.2d 978, cert. 
denied, 477 U.S. 907, 106 S.Ct. 3282 (1986). Under Idaho Code Section 72-7073 all "questions 
arising under this [workers' compensation] law, ... except as otherwise provided, shall be 
determined by the Commission." 
Defendants argue that the issue of comparative negligence is not a question arising "under this 
law" because a negligence claim is based on common law and Idaho statutory schemes outside 
the realm of workers' compensation law. They contend that workers' compensation laws focus 
on an injured worker's entitlement to benefits and the nature and extent of those benefits and 
that negligence claims must be brought in district court. Claimant's counter arguments are 
three-fold. First, the adjudication of comparative negligence (i.e., whether a negligent employer 
may be barred from subrogation recovery) is a subrogation matter under Idaho Code Section 
72-223(3) and 72-223(4). Second, Van Tine I, infra, and Van Tine ll, infra, and Idaho Code 
Section 72-7074 unquestionably vest the Commission with jurisdiction to hear subrogation 
matters. Third, the difficulties arising from not hearing this question before the Commission 
essentially create more problems than are necessary or reasonable. 
2 That section provides: 
72-211. Exclusiveness of employee's remedy. --Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, the rights and 
remedies herein granted to an employee on account of an injury or occupational diseasefor which he is entitled to 
compensation under this law shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his personal 
representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or disease. 
3 That section provides: 
72-707. Commission has jurisdiction of disputes. -All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement 
or stipulation of the interested parties wth the approval of the commission, except as othen1ise herein provided, 
shall be determined by the commission. 
4 That section provides: 
72-707. Commission hasjurisdiction of disputes. --All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement 
or stipulation of the interested parties wth the approval of the commission, except as othenise herein provided, 
shall be determined by the commission. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION -199911C 1014.3 
of the Idaho lnd ustrial Com mission 
199911C 1014.4 
9/3/1999 
Under Idaho Code Section 72-223(3)5 an employer who has paid benefits to an employee is subrogated 
to the rights of that employee against a third party and may seek reimbursement of workers' 
compensation benefits from a third-party recovery. The reason for allowing such reimbursement is to 
prevent an employee from obtaining a double recovery. Shields v. Wyeth, 95 Idaho 572, 513 P.2d 404 
(1973). However, there is an exception to the general rule requiring reimbursement of employer benefit 
payments. The Idaho Supreme Court in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Adams, 91 Idaho 151, 
417 P .2d 417 (1966), held that an employer whose negligence contributed to the injury of an employee 
was not entitled to reimbursement from the employee for workers' compensation payments made to the 
employee who had recovered sums from a third-party tortfeasor. The rationale behind denying benefits 
to a negligent employer is that it is contrary to the policy of the law for an employer (or the employer's 
surety) to profit from its own wrongdoing. Id. 
5 Idaho Code Section 72-223 provides: 
72-223. Third party liability. -- (1) the right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fict that 
the injury, occupational disease or deeth is caused under circumstances creating in some person other than the 
employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor, such person so liable being refe~red to as the third party. Such 
third party shall not include those employers des::ribed in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them 
contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied Vli.th the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho OJde; nor 
include the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business 
there carried on, but "Hho, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the 
direct employer of the WJrkmen there employed. 
(2) Action may be instituted against such third party by the employer; or in event compensation has been 
claimed and awarded, by the employee and employer jointly, in the employees name or, if the employee refuses to 
participate in such action, by the employer in the employees name. 
(3) If compensation has been claimed and aYVarded, the employer having paid sudt compensation or having 
become liable therefor, shall be subrogaed to the rights of the employee, to recover aganst such third party to the 
extent of the employer's compensation liability. 
( 4) On any recovery by the employee against a third party, the employer shall pay or have dedlflted from his 
subrogated portion thereof, a proportionate share of the cost and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in 
obtaining such recovery. 
(5) If the amount recovered from the third party exceeds the amount of the subrogated portion paydJle to the 
employer for past compensation benefits paid, then to the extent the employer has a future subrogated interest in 
that portion of the third party recove1y paid to the employee, the employer shall receive a creil against its future 
liability .for compensation benefits. Such credit shall apply as future compensation ben:fits become payable, and 
the employer shall reimburse the employee for the proportionate share of attorneys fees and costs paid by the 
employee in obtaining that portion of the third party recovery coresponding to the credit claimed. lhe employer 
shall not be required to pay such attorney's fees and costs related to the future credit prior to the time the credit is 
claimed. However, the employer and employee may agree to different terms if approved by the industrial 
commission. 
(6) If death results from the injury or occupaional disease and if the employee leaves no dependents entitled to 
benefits under this law, the surety shall have a right of action against the hird party for recovery of income 
benefits, reasonable expznses of medical and related services and burial exptJlse actually paid by the surety and 
for recovety of amounts paid into the industrial special indemnity accamt pursuant to section 72-420, Idaho Code, 
and such right of action shall be in addition to any cause of action of he heirs or personal 
representatives of the deceased. 
(7) All rights and restrictions herein grcnted to the employer have previously been intended to be, and are 
hereby expressly granted to the industrial special indemnity account. 
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Typically, an employer/surety pays an employee workers' compensation benefits. The worker 
files a claim in district court; the third party may then sue the employer to determine whether the 
employer was negligent. If the employer is found to be concurrently negligent, the employer is 
denied reimbursement and the third party is credited for the amount of workers' compensation 
benefits paid. If the employer is not found to be negligent, the employer obtains reimbursement 
for the workers' compensation benefits paid. See Schneider v. Farmers Merchant, Inc., 106 
Idaho 241, 678 P.2d 33 (1983). Here, however, there was no adjudication of or agreement 
regarding Employer's negligence. Whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to 
hear the question of an employer's negligence is a case of first impression in Idaho. 
The case ofVan Tine v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P.2d 717 (1994)(Van 
Tine I) is instructive. In that case, Van Tine filed both a workers' compensation claim as well as 
a third-party claim. He reached a settlement with the third party and the SIF claimed its 
subrogated interest in that third party settlement. Van Tine then filed a claim in district court 
alleging that the SIF had waived its subrogation rights to proceeds of the third party tort 
recovery. The Idaho Supreme Court held that subrogation rights to proceeds of a third-party 
settlement arise under Idaho Code Section 72-223(3). 
Whether SIF has lost this subrogation right for any reason affects SJF 's subrogation rights 
under l C. Section 72-223(3), and is therefore, a question within the exclusivejurisdiction of the 
Commission over which the trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction. 
Van Tine I, at 690 (emphasis added). 
Following Van Tine I, the Court issued Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 938 P.2d 
1228 (1997). There, Turner sued the negligent third party uninsured driver who caused his 
industrial accident. Claimant then filed an uninsured motorist claim against his employer's 
uninsured motorist policy. During arbitration he was awarded money less an offset which 
represented the amount previously paid by SIF to him. SIF then filed in district court requesting 
entitlement to reimbursement for the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid. The 
district court determined the SIF did not have a right to subrogation. Relying on Van Tine I, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the SIF's subrogation right to proceeds of the third party 
settlement arose under Idaho Code Section 72-223(3) and was thus a question within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission over which the trial court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
The holding in Van Tine I that subrogation issues are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Commission was recently reaffirmed in Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Van Tine, Slip Op. 65 
(issued June 9, 1999), _ P .2d _ (1999)(V an Tine II). The Commission in Van Tine II had 
approved a lump sum settlement for the workers' compensation case. In the agreement, the 
parties also agreed that the issue ofthe SIF's subrogation claim would be resolved in one of two 
related suits that had been filed in district court. 
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After the Supreme Court ruled in Van Tine I that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
hear that issue, the SIF petitioned the Commission for a declaratory ruling on the subrogation 
issue, which petition the Commission denied for lack of timely filing. The SIP appealed. The 
Court held: 
it is clear that the legislature intended, in order for the workers' compensation law to achieve 
its purpose of providing sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families, that all 
claims, issues and civil actions relating in any manner to the injury of a worker, whether 
procedural or substantive, be decided under the workers ' compensation act by the Commission. 
Van Tine II, Slip Op. 65, p. 10 (emphasis added). The Court expressly stated, "This would also 
include subrogation issues." 
In short, comparative negligence can "arise under" Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law when it 
affects the employer's entitlement to credits and offsets against the third-party recovery under 
Idaho Code Section 72-223. It is true that the issue of comparative negligence is normally 
litigated in trial court because such a claim is based on common law and Idaho statutory 
schemes. However, where any substantive or procedural issues relating in any manner to a 
subrogation claim remains unresolved after the conclusion of a district court case, they are to be 
decided under the Workers' Compensation Act by the Commission. 
While the issue before the Commission is one of first impression in Idaho, the matter has been 
addressed and resolved by the California Supreme Court (Court) in Roe v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Bd., 12 Cal.3d 884, 528 P.2d 771 (1974). In that case as in this one, the 
injured worker, Roe, filed a third-party action, but his employer/surety stayed out of the district 
court proceeding. There, as here, the worker and the third party settled the lawsuit without 
reference to the employer's concurrent negligence. Roe then applied to the Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Board (Board) for permanent disability benefits. Roe's attorney, as did 
Claimant's attorney here, sought to raise the employer's concurrent negligence as a bar to a 
credit against the surety's liability. The referee and the Board refused to inquire into the 
employer's concurrent negligence and awarded benefits. 
According to California's subrogation statutes, an employer/surety may recover from a third 
party amounts previously paid an employee through one of three methods: ( 1) by bringing a 
direct action against the third party; (2) by joining as a party plaintiff in a suit brought by the 
employee; or, (3) by applying to the court for a first lien on the judgment recovered by the 
employee. Thus, Judge Burke in a dissenting opinion concluded that it was clear that whenever 
the issue of concurrent negligence is raised as a bar to the employer's reimbursement, the 
adjudication of fault would be made by a judicial body. He concluded that favoring the Board 
with jurisdiction of that issue would lead to several substantial problems of administration of 
justice in addition to introducing fault into workers' compensation proceedings contrary to 
sound principles of workers' compensation and contrary to the California Constitution. The 
minority's arguments are similar to those raised in this case and were rejected by the majority. 
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The Court majority held that the Labor Code subrogation provisions are primarily procedural 
and that the Board has the task of adjudicating the issue of the employer's concurrent negligence 
when no court has done so and it is raised as a bar to the employer's claim of offset against 
compensation liability for the amount recovered from the third-party tortfeasor. In doing so, the 
Court had to resolve two potentially conflicting lines of cases. On the one hand, the law in 
California, as in Idaho, was clear that: 
The subrogation provisions of the [California workers' compensation law} were not designed to 
permit a negligent employer to take advantage of his own wrong; hence, where the employer's 
negligence had been established in a prior lawsuit the employee could assert this adjudication 
as a bar to the employer's claim of credit before the appeals board. 
Roe, supra, 528 P.2d at 774 (relying on Nelsen v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 11 Cal.App.3d 
472, 89 Cal.Rptr. 638(1970)). 
On the other hand, the policy in California, as in Idaho, was equally well established that an 
employee could not enjoy a double recovery in both tort law and workers' compensation 
benefits. See Corley v. Workman's Comp. Appeals Bd., 22 Cal.App.3d 447, 99 Cal.Rptr. 242 
(1971 ). 
In sum, when the third party lawsuit settles without an adjudication of the employer's 
negligence, and the employer then seeks to exercise its statutory subrogation rights to 
reimbursement of benefits already paid or to be paid, the two policies are on a collision course: 
Cases like this [Roe} require selection or reconciliation between these policies. In Nelsen, the 
court implied that the policy of preventing the employer from reaping financial benefit from his 
own negligence outweighed the policy against the employee's double recovery. In Corley, the 
court embraced the inhibition against double recovery even at the costs of permitting a 
negligent employer to reduce his work[ers '} compensation liability. 
Roe, 528 P.2d at 774 (citations and revised punctuation omitted). 
The California Supreme Court resolved the conflict by holding that the policy denying a 
negligent employer from recouping its payments to an injured worker took precedence over the 
policy against the worker's double recovery. 
Granting the employer an automatic credit for the employee's damage recovery manifests more 
solicitude for the employer/carrier than for the employee. The injured work[er} is the prime 
object of constitutional solicitude. By entertaining the work[er'sj Witt v. Jackson defense, the 
appeals board violates neither constitutional letter nor spirit. 
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Roe, 528 P.2d at 776. The California Supreme Court's reliance on Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.2d 
57, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641 (1961)(holding that an employer may not recover from a 
third party if his own negligence contributed to the accident), in the central holding of the Roe 
case is important because the Idaho Supreme Court relied on Witt v. Jackson in establishing its 
own policy against reimbursement by a negligent employer. See, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Companyv. Adams, 91 Idaho 151,417 P.2d 417 (1966). 
The Court rejected the employer's allegation that the Board would not be competent to resolve a 
claim of employer negligence: 
The appeals board's lack of experience in adjudicating fault issues is a policy objection of little 
weight. Sections [ofthe California worker's compensation law} require the board to alter the 
amount of the award when either employee or employer has been guilty of serious and wilful 
misconduct. Serious and wilful misconduct decisions may be complex and difficult. The board 
may decide a claim of employer negligence with no more and probably less difficulty than the 
issue of serious and wilful misconduct. 
Roe, 528 P.2d at 777.6 
Despite its holding, the Court appeared troubled at its own conclusion that the Board would be 
required to adjudicate negligence cases. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that this procedure 
was dictated by the policy at stake and that any alternative procedure would have to be supplied 
by the legislature: "Perhaps the courts are better suited than the board to adjudicate the 
employee's counterthrust of employer negligence. If so, the Legislature may consider 
appropriate amendments." Id. 
Even without considering possible legal maneuvering, the Court concluded that quantification (a 
mathematical factor for allocating monetary responsibility) is not possible when a third party 
lawsuit ends in a settlement or award before workers' compensation benefits are fixed, or when 
the lawsuit is concluded without resolving the issue of employer negligence. The Court further 
concluded that the question of whether an employee's damage recovery is a workers' 
compensation benefit is one that is yet to be determined and the quantification thereof may be 
adjudicated by the Board: 
6 A major consideration for the California Supreme Court, in finding that the Board must have jurisdiction to 
resolve allegations of employer negligence was the likelihood that the contrary holding would result in "undesirable 
gamesmanship" whereby, "A concurrently negligent employer [would] stand aside from the third party lawsuit, 
then capitalize on the third party's damage payment in the form of a credit from the appeals board." Id. at 776. 
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To classifY the employee's damage recovery as a work[ers 1 compensation benefit at the outset 
of the hearing begs a question yet to be determined. At that point the employee stands before the 
board with an achieved recovery of damages. If the employer has been negligent, the recovery is 
unalloyed tort damages; none of it belongs to the employer, none of it is available to offset the 
employer's compensation liability. If the employer is freed of fault, he is entitled to the offset; to 
that extent the employee's recovery is the equivalent of work[ers 1 compensation benefits 
(receivedfrom the third party in lieu ofthe latter's liability to the fault-free employer). 7 
Id. The Referee finds this reasoning persuasive. 
In conclusion, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code 
SectionSection 72-201,72-211, 72-707, and 72-223, and Van Tine land Van Tine II, supra, to 
hear the issue of alleged comparative negligence of Defendant Employer under the facts of this 
case where that issue has not been resolved in trial court without prior adjudication or agreement 
of the parties. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing Findings and Conclusions as 
its own and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho, August 23, 1999. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
/s/ Peggy McMahon, Referee 
7 This dual system requires the Board to accept tre trial court's prior adjudication of employer negligence. See, 
Runcom v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 Idaho 389 690 P.2d 324 (1984), which essentially has the same 
requirement 
There is but one cause of action under the statute, and one right to subrogation, and if the action i!hrought in the 
employees name the employer and its surety are bound by estoppel to the results of thattrial conducted by the 
employee. (Citations omitted.) 
Id., at 396. The estoppel issue of Employer's negligence is not before the Commission in this recommended 
decision; nor has there been an adjudication of this matter at district court. 
Davis, Kevin J. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION- 199911C 1014.9 
D the Idaho lnd ustrial Com mission 
ORDER 
1999 IIC 1014.10 
9/3/1999 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-717, Referee Peggy McMahon submitted the record in the 
above case, together with her recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation to the members of the Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the 
undersigned Commissioners reviewed the record and considered the Referee's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. The Commission concurs in the Referee's 
recommended Findings of Fact and agrees with the Referee's recommended Conclusions of 
Law. Therefore, the Commission approves, confirms, and adopts the Referee's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That: 
1. The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code SectionSection 72-201, 
72-211, 72-707 and 72-223; Van Tine v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P.2d 
717 (1994)(Van Tine I); and Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Van Tine, Slip Op. 65 (issued June 
9, 1999, _ P.2d _ (1999)(Van Tine II) to hear the issue of alleged comparative negligence 
of Defendant Employer under the facts of this case where that issue has not been resolved in trial 
court without prior adjudication or agreement of the parties. 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated. 
DATED in Boise, Idaho, on this 3rd day of September, 1999. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
/s/ Rachel S. Gilbert, Chairman 
/s/ James F. Kile, Commissioner 
/s/ James E. Kerns, Commissioner 
Davis, Kevin J. 
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HEARING AND NOTICE OF 
AMENDED HEARING ISSUES 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 21, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to bifurcate and stay proceedings for 
determination of novel issues of law. Currently, the parties are scheduled for a hearing before 
Referee Marsters on June 3, 2011. Defendants now request a separate hearing on subrogation 
issues distinct from the underlying workers' compensation claim issues. Defendants propose 
that the following threshold issues be addressed prior to hearing on the merits of the underlying 
workers' compensation claim: (1) whether the release of all claims permits or effects a 
limitation on R&L Carriers' right of subrogation guaranteed by Idaho Code § 72-223; (2) 
whether the characterization of the recovery as among Claimant, his wife, and the third parties is 
binding on R&L Carriers; and (3) whether workers' compensation benefits are community 
property and, if so, whether a recovery for loss of consortium is also community property. 
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Because Defendants believe these are issues of first impression and complex issues of law, 
Defendants request a hearing before the full Commission to adjudicate these subrogation issues. 
The parties are in general agreement concerning the relevant facts: Claimant was an 
employee ofR&L Carriers. On or about 2-28-08, Claimant was involved in a compensable work 
related injury when the vehicle he was driving was struck by another vehicle owned and operated 
by Ameri-Co Carriers Inc. Claimant filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer 
for his injuries. That claim was evidently accepted by employer, and workers' compensation 
benefits in an unspecified amount have been paid to Claimant, or on his behalf, in connection 
with the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident. A June 3, 2011, hearing is set to 
determine Claimant's entitlement to additional workers' compensation benefits. 
Contemporaneous with his pursuit of workers' compensation benefits, Claimant also made claim 
against Ameri-Co, the negligent third party, for the injuries he sustained as a result of the 2-28-
08 accident. In addition to the claim against Ameri-Co made by Claimant, Claimant's wife also 
made her claim against Ameri-Co for loss of consortium. The claims of both the Claimant and 
his wife were subsequently resolved for the sum of $200,000. That settlement is memorialized 
in a release and indemnity agreement executed by both Claimant and his wife in October 2009. 
The release and indemnity agreement does not purport to attach a value to the loss of consortium 
claim of Claimant's wife, nor does the release and indemnity agreement purport to attach a value 
to the injuries Claimant received as a result of the motor vehicle accident. Rather, the claims of 
both Claimant and his wife are jointly settled for the sum of $200,000. Claimant and his wife 
were represented by D. Scott Summer, Esq., in connection with the claim against Ameri-Co. 
Pursuant to his agreement with Claimant and Claimant's wife, Mr. Summer took a fee against 
the $200,000 settlement in the amount of $70,000. He also recovered costs advanced in the 
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amount of $307.60. In a letter dated November 13, 2009, Mr. Summer purported to attribute 
$I 00,000 of the $200,000 settlement to Claimant's wife for her loss of consortium claim, with 
the balance of the settlement attributable to Claimant's injuries. 
Defendants claim a right of subrogation to the proceeds of the third party settlement 
under I.C. § 72-223. Defendants evidently take the position that they are subrogated to the 
proceeds of the entire settlement, less the attorney's fees incurred by Claimant and his wife in 
connection with obtaining the settlement. 1 Claimant, on the other hand, contends that at the very 
least, Defendants' right of subrogation does not attach to that portion of the settlement 
attributable to the loss of consortium claim of Claimant's wife. Without specifically conceding 
the point, counsel for Claimant appears to tacitly acknowledge that absent a judicial 
determination of the value of the loss of consortium claim of Claimant's wife, the unilateral 
pronouncement of Mr. Summer as to how the proceeds of the $200,000 settlement should be 
attributed as between Claimant and his wife is of little assistance in determining the extent of 
Defendants' I. C. § 72-223 right of subrogation, if, indeed, the portion of the settlement actually 
attributable to the loss of consortium claim is beyond the reach of Defendants. 
The central dispute, then, is whether Defendants' I.C. § 72-223 right of subrogation 
extends to that portion of the third party settlement payable to Claimant's wife for her loss of 
consortium claim, and if not, what portion of the third party settlement is actually attributable to 
the loss of consortium claim. Assuming, but not deciding, that the monies payable to Claimant's 
wife for loss of consortium are not subject to the Defendants' I.C. § 72-233 right of subrogation, 
the Commission agrees that it has jurisdiction to consider what portion of the third party 
settlement is actually attributable to the loss of consortium claim. As Claimant has noted, this is 
1 There may be a dispute between the parties as to the amount of the attorney fee reduction anticipated by I.C. § 72-
223(4). 
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exactly the issue that was before the Commission in the case of Davis v. Wayne's Transmission, 
1999, IIC 1014 (1999), although that case dealt with the need to address the issue of employer's 
comparative fault in connection with employer's attempt to assert an I.C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation against the proceeds of a third party settlement. Here, Claimant asserts that 50% of 
the proceeds of the third party settlement are beyond the application of the I. C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation, since half of the settlement was paid to Claimant's wife for loss of consortium. To 
resolve this issue, and assuming, without deciding, that the monies payable for loss of 
consortium are beyond the application of the provisions of I.C. § 72-223, the task for the 
Commission is to actually determine what percentage of the third party settlement is attributable 
to the loss of consortium claim. In the underlying third party claim, Claimant and his wife each 
had an incentive to maximize their damages. In the context of the instant proceeding, Claimant 
now has an incentive to maximize only the claim for loss of consortium, since the larger that 
number turns out to be, the smaller will be the sum to which Defendants' I.C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation will attach. At any hearing of the type contemplated in Davis v. Wayne's 
Transmission, supra, the parties will be required to put on proof relevant to establishing what 
percentage of the $200,000 third party settlement is fairly attributable to the loss of consortium 
claim. This will necessitate putting on proof of the value of the loss of consortium claim, as well 
as proof of the extent and degree of Claimant's damages. The $200,000 settlement may not have 
been sufficient to actually compensate Claimant and his wife for their damages. Therefore, a 
proper apportionment of the $200,000 settlement cannot be made simply by putting on proof of 
the value of the loss of consortium claim. It is necessary to ascertain the total damages of 
Claimant and his wife, and in this fashion establish the relevant ratio to be applied to ascertain 
ORDER BIFURCATING HEARING AND 
NOTICE OF AMENDED HEARING ISSUES -4 
what portion of the $200,000 settlement is appropriately attributable to the loss of consortium 
claim. 
After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the Commission agrees that it is appropriate 
to bifurcate this matter to address the following threshold issues: 
1. Whether the Release and Indemnity Agreement between Claimant, his wife, and the 
negligent third party, permits or effects a limitation on Defendants' right of subrogation 
under I.C. § 72-223; 
2. Whether the unilateral characterization of the relative interests of Claimant and his wife 
in the proceeds of the third party settlement, as set forth in the November 13, 2009, letter 
of D. Scott Summer, Esq., is binding on Defendants; 
3. Whether the recovery by Claimant's wife for loss of consortium in the third party action 
IS a recovery against of which Defendants may assert the I.C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation; 
4. If not, what percentage of the $200,000 third party settlement is attributable to the loss of 
consortium claim; 
5. Quite apart from the issues surrounding the loss of consortium claim, to what extent is 
Claimant's recovery in the third party action community property, and to what extent 
may Defendants assert an I.C. § 72-223 claim of subrogation to community property, 
one-half of which is the separate property of Claimant, and one-half of which is the 
separate property of Claimant's wife; and 
6. What is the amount of costs and attorneys fees that should be deducted from Defendants' 
I. C. § 72-223 recovery pursuant to I. C. § 72-223( 4). 
The Commission agrees that it is appropriate to adopt the June 3, 2011, hearing date to 
address the aforementioned issues. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that a bifurcated 
hearing will be held before the full Commission in the above entitled matter on June 3, 2011, at 
9:00a.m., for one (1) day in the Industrial Commission hearing room, 700 Clearwater Lane, City 
of Boise, County of Ada, State ofldaho, on the issues set forth above in Paragraphs 1 6. The 
parties shall be ready to proceed at the scheduled time for hearing. 
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Further, it is ORDERED that the issues originally scheduled to be heard on June 3, 2011, 
as outlined in the January 12, 2011, Notice of Hearing, shall be reserved and held in abeyance for 
a future hearing. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~~t 
I hereby certify that on the_: _day of April, 2011 a true and correct copy of ORDER 
BIFURCATING HEARING AND NOTICE OF AMENDED HEARING ISSUES was 
served by regular United States Mail upon: 
JON BAUMAN 
KRISTINA \VILSON 
251 EAST FRONT STREET, SUITE 300 
PO BOX 1539 
BOISE ID 83701 
RICHARD OWEN 
206 12TH A VENUE ROAD 
POBOX278 
NAMPA ID 83653 
amw 
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RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 





























I. C. No. 2008-011032 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW Claimant, by ru.1d through his attorney of record, hereby moves this 
Commission for its Order Compelling Defendants to respond to Claimant's Supplemental 
Interrogatories to Defendants and Claimant's Supplemental Request for Production of Documents 
to Defendants filed on or about the 18th day of April, 2011. 
MOTION TO COMPEL- PG. 1 
DATED this~ day ofMay, 2011. 
By: ___ ----"-"~"'----'----~-~---
Richard S. Owen 
CERTIFICATE OF Mi\ILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _j3_ day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, U.S. Postage prepaid, to: 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
:MOTION TO COMPEL- PG. 2 
RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 





























I. C. No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through his attorney of record and hereby requests that the 
Industrial Commission include the following issues in the hearing now set to commence on July 26 
and 27, 2011: 
1. The reasonable value of Claimant's third party claim, including the claim of 
Claimant's wife, Sophia Izaguirre; 
2. The reasonable value of the elements ofthe claim brought by Claimant and his wife 
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against the third party herein including: 
a. Claimant's past and future medical expense; 
b. Claimant's past and future wage loss; 
c. The value of Claimant's wife's past and future loss of consortium; and 
d. The value of Claimant's past and future general damage. 
3. Whether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein are affected by the 
adequacy of the settlement made by Claimant ofhis third party case. 
4. \\Thether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein allow Surety to 
attach that portion of Claimant's third-party settlement which is attributed to 
Claimant's pain and suffering. 
5. \\That attorney's fee should be used underidaho Code 72-223(4) and (5) . 
.,-
DATED This '1..._) day ofMay, 2011. 
By: _____ -'-~=------'-----2_-~---
Richard S. Owen 
REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES - PG. 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of May, 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES - PG. 3 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Bauman- ISB #2989 
Wilson - ISB #7962 
Attorney for Defendants 
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FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I.C. No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P .A., hereby request 
that the Industrial Commission include the following issues among those to be heard at the 
hearing now set to commence on July 26 and 27, 2011: 
REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES - 1 
71 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable 
value of Claimant's third party claim, including the claim of Claimant's wife, 
Sophia Izaguirre. 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable 
value of the elements of the claim brought by Claimant and his wife against the 
third party. 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the adequacy of 
the settlement made by Claimant in his third party case. 
4. Whether any additional costs and attorney fees should be deducted from 
Defendants' I. C. § 72-223 recovery, and if so, the basis for deducting them. 
DATED this S day of June, 2011. 
// 
/ 
ELAM & ~RKE, P 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 day of June, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Richard Owen 
RICHARD OWEN LAW OFFICE 
206 12th A venue Road 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES - 2 
U.S. Mail 
RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 





























I. C. No. 2008-011032 
:MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through his attorney of record, and Moves this Commission 
for its Order Compelling Defendant to produce documents to Claimant in relation to Claimant's 
Request for Production Nos. 1, 4, 11. 
REQUEST NO. 1: Full and complete copies of any and all records within Defendants' 
possession or control relating to Claimant's earnings while engaged in his/her employment with 
Defendant. This request is meant to include photocopies of all paychecks, bonus checks, evidence 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY-- PG. 1 
/ 
of tips, or evidence demonstrating compensation of any kind whatsoever. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.1, DATED 12/14/2011 (sic): Defendants object to this 
request to the extent it seeks infmmation protected by attorney work-product or attorney-client 
privilege. Subject to and without waiving the objections, please see the attached documents. 
Defense counsel requested Claimant's personnel file and will seasonably supplement this answer 
with any non-privileged infmmation when it is received. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.1, DATED 5/23/2011: Subject to 
and without waiver of all prior objections and responses to this request for production, Defense 
counsel has requested Claimant's personnel file and will seasonably supplement this answer with 
any non-privileged information when it is received. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Photocopy of any and all work evaluation documents, including intra-
company evaluations concerning Claimant, whether formal or informal. This Request is also meant 
to include any written or recorded information regarding disciplinary actions taken with regard to 
Claimant, any wage review procedures, or any other documentation relating to Claimant's job 
performance. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.4, DATED 12/14/201:IDefendants object to this request 
to the extent it seeks information protected by attorney work-product or attorney-client privilege. 
Subject to and without waiving the objections, Defense counsel requested Claimant's persoru1el file 
and will seasonably supplement this answer with any non-privileged information when it is received. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.4, DATED 5/23/2011 : See 
Supplemental Response to Request No.4 (sic), above. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Please produce any and all documentation within Claimant's personnel 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY-- PG. 2 
file, medical file or any other files kept on Claimant's behalfby Employer herein. This is meant to 
include Claimant's application for employment, any records regarding Claimant's wages, any records 
regarding Claimant's job performance, any records regarding any disciplinary actions taken against 
Claimant, any records regarding complaints made by Claimant or complaints made against Claimant 
during the course of his employment with Employer herein, any notices or documentation regarding 
any injury which Claimant suffered while in the employ of Employer herein, any records generated 
as a result of any injury suffered by Claimant by Claimant's supervisor or any other person who 
investigated or was contacted regarding such injury, any records regarding Claimant's off work 
status as a result of any work injury, any records regarding Claimant's potential return to work 
following a work -related injury, any records regarding Claimant's ability to return to work following 
a work-related injury or any records concerning Claimant's retention following a work-related injury. 
In summary, this request asks for every piece of paper retained by Employer herein with 
regard to Claimant's employment, his work related injury, or any matter pertaining thereto. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11, DATED 12/14/2010: Defendants object to this 
request to the extent it seeks information protected by attorney work-product or attorney-client 
privilege. Defendants further object to the extent the request seeks information from or about non-
testing consultants. Subject to and without waiving the objections, Defense counsel requested 
Claimant's personnel file and will seasonably supplement this answer with any non-privileged 
information when it is received. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST N0.11, DATED 5/23/2011: See Supplemental Response to 
Request No. 4, above. 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY-- PG. 3 
DATED This-----""'---- day of June, 2011. 
By: ____ __.~'-----~-------'-
Richard S. Owen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this--~- day of June, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, U.S. Postage prepaid, to: 
Jon Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United State Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
RichardS. Owen 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY -- PG. 4 
RICHARD S. OW'EN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant 





























I. C. No. 2008-011032 
WITHDRAWAL OF ISSUE 
COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through his attorney of record and hereby requests that the 
Industrial Commission withdraw the listed issues for the hearing now set to commence July 26 and 
27,2011: 
1. The reasonable value of Claimant's third party claim, including the claim of 
Claimant's wife, Sophia Izaguirre, 
2. The reasonable value of the elements of the claim achieved b10ught by Claimant and 
WITHDRAWAL OF ISSUE- PG. 1 
I 
his wife against the third party herein including: 
a. Claimant's past and future medical expense; 
b. Claimant's past and future wage loss; 
c. The value of Claimant's wife's past and future loss ofconsmiium; and 
d. The value of Claimant's past and future general damage. 
3. Whether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein are affected by the 
adequacy of the settlement made by Claimant of his third party case. 
4. Whether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein allow Surety to 
attach that pmiion of Claimant's third-party settlement which is attributed to 
Claimant's pain and suffering. 
5. What attorney's fee should be used under Idaho Code 72-223(4) and (5). 
Claimant requests a telephone conference with the Industrial Commission to discuss the 
ramifications of the addition/deletion of these issues. 
DATED This-~- day ofJune, 2011. 
RichardS. Owen 
WITHDRA \VAL OF ISSUE - PG. 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of June, 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83 701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
RichardS. Owen 
vVITHDRA W AL OF ISSUE - PG. 3 





























ORDER AMENDING HEARING 
ISSUES 
E 
The Commission held a telephone status conference with the parties on April18, 2011, to 
discuss the presentation of evidence and clarify the issues. During the May 17, 2011, telephone 
conference, the parties were given leave to submit additional issues to the Commission, if 
desired. Claimant and Defendants both submitted additional issues for the Commission's July 
26-27, 2011 hearing with the parties. 
On May 26, 2011, Claimant requested inclusion of the following issues: 
1. The reasonable value of Claimant's third-party claim, including the claim of 
Claimant's wife, Sophia Izaguirre; 
2. The reasonable value of the elements of the claim brought by Claimant and his wife 
against the third party herein, including: 
a. Claimant's past and future medical expense; 
b. Claimant's past and future wage loss; 
ORDER AMENDING HEARING ISSUES - 1 
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c. The value of Claimant's wife's past and future loss of consortium; and, 
d. The value of Claimant's past and future general damage. 
3. Whether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein are affected by the 
adequacy of the settlement made by Claimant of his third party case. 
4. Whether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein allow Surety to 
attach that portion of Claimant's third-party settlement which is attributed to 
Claimant's pain and suffering. 
5. What attorney's fees should be used under Idaho Code§ 72-223(4) and (5). 
On June 3, 2011, Defendants requested inclusion ofthe following additional issues: 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable value of 
Claimant's third-party claim including the claim of Claimant's wife, Sophia Izaguirre; 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable value of 
the elements of the claim brought by Clamant and his wife against the third party; 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the adequacy of the 
settlement made by Claimant in his third-party case; 
4. Whether any additional costs and attorney fees should be deducted from Defendants' 
Idaho Code§ 72-223 recovery, and if so, the basis for deducting them. 
On June 7, Claimant modified his requested issues for the July 26-27, 2011, hearing 
before the Commission. Claimant withdrew his first and third additional hearing issue, and 
modified his second requested issue as follows: 
2. The reasonable value of the elements of the claim achieved brought by Claimant and 
his wife against the third party herein, including: 
a. Claimant's past and future medical expense; 
ORDER AMENDING HEARING ISSUES - 2 
b. Claimant's past and future wage loss; 
c. The value of Claimant's wife's past and future loss of consortium; and, 
d. The value of Claimant's past and future general damage. 
After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the Commission agrees that it 1s 
appropriate to amend the issues to be decided at hearing as follows: 
1. Whether the Release and Indemnity Agreement between Claimant, his wife, and 
the negligent third party, permits or effects a limitation on Defendants' right of 
subrogation under I.C. § 72-223; 
2. Whether the unilateral characterization of the relative interests of Claimant and 
his wife in the proceeds of the third party settlement, as set forth in the November 13, 
2009, letter of D. Scott Summer, Esq., is binding on Defendants; 
3. Whether the recovery by Claimant's wife for loss of consortium in the third party 
action is a recovery against which Defendants may assert the I.C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation; 
4. If not, what percentage of the $200,000 third party settlement is attributable to the 
loss of consortium claim; 
5. To what extent is Claimant's recovery in the third party action community 
property, and to what extent may Defendants assert an I. C. § 72-223 claim of subrogation 
to community property, one-half of which is the separate property of Claimant, and one-
half of which is the separate property of Claimant's wife; 
6. What is the amount of costs and attorneys fees that should be deducted from 
Defendants' I.C. § 72-223 recovery pursuant to I.C. § 72-223(4)-(5); 
7. The reasonable value of the elements of the claims of Claimant and his wife 
against the third party herein, including: 
a. Claimant's past and future medical expense; 
b. Claimant's past and future wage loss; 
c. The value of Claimant's wife's past and future loss of consortium; and, 
d. The value of Claimant's past and future general damage. 
8. Whether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein allow Surety to 
attach that portion of Claimant's third-party settlement which is attributed to Claimant's 
pain and suffering; 
ORDER AMENDING HEARING ISSUES - 3 
9. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable 
value of Claimant's third-party claim including the claim of Claimant's wife, Sophia 
Izaguirre; 
10. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable 
value of the elements of the claim brought by Clamant and his wife against the third 
party; and, 
11. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the adequacy of 
the settlement made by Claimant in his third-party case. 
The Commission agrees that it is appropriate to adopt the aforementioned issues. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that a bifurcated hearing on these issues will be held 
before the full Commission in the above entitled matter on July 26, 2011 and July 27, 2011. 
The parties shall be ready to proceed at the scheduled time for hearing. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 2Jr&- day of June, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
! /)1m- ------/ 
R.D. Maynard, Cm~sioner 
ORDER AMENDING HEARING ISSUES - 4 
9/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ptday of June, 2011 a true and correct copy of ORDER 
A.T\1ENDING HEARING ISSUES was served by regular United States Mail upon: 
JON BAUMAN 
KRISTINA WILSON 
251 EAST FRONT STREET, SUITE 300 
PO BOX 1539 
BOISE ID 83701 
RICHARD OWEN 
206 12TH AVENUE ROAD 
PO BOX 278 
NAMPA ID 83653 
mw 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
E 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission (Commission) 
assigned the above-entitled matter to the Commissioners, who conducted a hearing in Boise, 
Idaho on July 26, 2011. Claimant, Rubio Izaguirre, was present in person and represented by 
Richard Owen, of Nampa. Defendant Employer, R&L Carriers, and Defendant Surety, Zurich 
American Insurance, were represented by Jon Bauman, of Boise. The parties presented oral and 
documentary evidence. Post-hearing briefs were later submitted and the matter came under 
advisement on September 27, 2011. 
ISSUES 
The issues to be decided by the Commission as the result of a pre-hearing conference and 
agreement at the hearing are listed below. They have been reordered from the Order Amending 
Hearing Issues to correlate with the flow of the discussion in this decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 1 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable 
value of Claimant's third party claim including the claim of Claimant's wife, Sophia 
Izaguirre; 
2. \\lhether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable 
value of the elements of the claim brought by Clamant and his wife against the third 
party; 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the adequacy of 
the settlement made by Claimant in his third party case; 
4. Whether the Release and Indemnity Agreement between Claimant, his wife, and 
the negligent third party, permits or effects a limitation on Defendants' right of 
subrogation under I.C. § 72-223; 
5. Whether the unilateral characterization of the relative interests of Claimant and 
his wife in the proceeds of the third party settlement, as set forth in the November 13, 
2009, letter of D. Scott Summer, Esq., is binding on Defendants; 
6. Whether the recovery by Claimant's wife for loss of consortium in the third party 
action is a recovery against which Defendants may assert the I.C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation; 
7. If not, what percentage of the $200,000 third party settlement is attributable to the 
loss of consortium claim; 
8. To what extent is Claimant's recovery in the third party action community 
property, and to what extent may Defendants assert an I. C. § 72-223 claim of subrogation 
to community property, one-half of which is the separate property of Claimant, and one-
half of which is the separate property of Claimant's wife; 
9. What is the amount of costs and attorney fees that should be deducted from 
Defendants' I.C. § 72-223 recovery pursuant to I.C. § 72-223(4)-(5); 
10. The reasonable value of the elements of the claims of Claimant and his wife 
against the third party herein, including: 
a. Claimant's past and future medical expense; 
b. Claimant's past and future wage loss; 
c. The value of Claimant's wife's past and future loss of consortium; and, 
d. The value of Claimant's past and future general damage. 
11. \\lhether or not the subrogation rights possessed by Surety herein allow Surety to 
attach that portion of Claimant's third party settlement which is attributed to Claimant's 
pain and suffering; 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 2 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
It is undisputed that Claimant suffered a work-related motor vehicle accident resulting in 
an injury requiring medical treatment and indemnity benefits paid by Defendants. Thereafter, 
Claimant and his wife entered into a settlement with the third party responsible for the accident. 
The parties now seek direction from the Commission as to what portion of the proceeds of the 
third party settlement is subject to Defendants' subrogation claim. 
Claimant contends that the Commission has jurisdiction to decide the reasonable value of 
the elements of the Claimant's third party claim, including the value of the claim of Claimant's 
wife for her loss of consortium. Claimant does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to 
decide the adequacy of the third party settlement. Claimant concedes that the third party 
settlement and the execution of the Release and Indemnity Agreement do not have any effect on 
Defendants' right of subrogation in this case. Claimant avers that the attorney fees in the third 
party settlement, in the amount of thirty-five percent, cannot be modified. Claimant further 
contends that the loss of consortium damage in this case was damage suffered by the wife alone 
and is her sole and separate property. Claimant's recovery for pain and suffering, which is never 
paid by workers' compensation, is his own separate and personal property and not subject to the 
rights of subrogation. 
Defendants agree with Claimant, that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
decide the adequacy of the third party settlement and that the characterization of the settlement 
has no binding effect on Defendants' right of subrogation. Defendants argue that they are 
entitled to a right of subrogation in the entirety of a third party settlement, subject only to a 
deduction for attorney fees and costs. They aver that the Commission does not have the 
jurisdiction to differentiate between the types of damages or attempt to apportion the settlement. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 3 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The Industrial Commission legal file; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits 1-7, and 9-14 admitted at the hearing; 
3. Defendants' Exhibits 1-9, 11-40, admitted at the hearing; 
4. The testimony of Claimant, Sofia Izaguirre, Lene O'Dell, Martha Peterson, Kurt 
Holzer, and Merlyn Clark taken at the hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was born in Mexico but moved to Texas when he was twelve years old. 
Two years later his family moved to California. Claimant completed the eighth grade and began 
working full time at the age of seventeen. At the time of the hearing, Claimant was 51 years old 
and resided in Caldwell, Idaho. 
2. When Claimant was seventeen he met Sofia, his wife, and they were married 
three years later. Claimant and his wife moved to Idaho in 1995. 
3. Claimant began driving truck when he was 26, and he has spent the majority of 
his life working as a driver for companies or as a self-employed driver. Most of Claimant's 
driving allowed him to be home at the end of every day, but some jobs included long hauls 
lasting up to five consecutive days on the road. 
4. At the time of the February 2008 accident, Claimant was employed by R&L 
Carriers earning between $1,300 and $1,600 per week as well as receiving health insurance and 
disability insurance. Claimant was a combo driver, tasked with driving as well as loading and 
unloading merchandise. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 4 
5. On February 28, 2008, Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. His 
semi-truck was struck by another semi-truck on the interstate near SnO\vville, Utah. Claimant's 
truck and two of the three trailers he was pulling were knocked over. Claimant first sought 
medical care on February 29, 2008, when he presented at West Valley Medical Center. He was 
diagnosed with an acute cervical strain and contusions on his chest and left knee, and taken off 
work for three days. 
6. On March 3, 2008, Claimant presented at Saint Alphonsus Medical group 
Occupational Medicine and was seen by Kevin Chicoine, M.D. Claimant reported that he had 
mild, non-radiating pain in his neck. Dr. Chicoine imposed restrictions of no lifting, pushing, or 
pulling in excess of 25 pounds, as well as no squatting or kneeling. Claimant participated in 
physical therapy and the pain in his chest and neck resolved. 
7. Claimant's knee pain continued and an MRl was performed on April 18, 2008, 
which revealed a left knee cartilage tear. On October 9, 2008, Claimant had arthoscopic surgery 
on the left knee by William Lindner, M.D. On November 14, 2008, Dr. Lindner released 
Claimant to full duty work, stating that if he cannot tolerate his work some accommodation from 
those duties will need to be made. Claimant continued with physical therapy until January 6, 
2009. 
8. On April 6, 2009, Paul Collins, M.D., conducted an independent medical 
examination (IME) at Defendants' request. Dr. Collins found some puffiness in Claimant's knee 
and minimal crepitation in Claimant's left knee. The doctor found that Claimant was not yet 
stable and recommended a home based exercise program and reported that Claimant seemed 
well-motivated. The prior restrictions of no squatting or kneeling and no pushing, pulling, or 
lifting more than 25 pounds were continued. Dr. Collins opined that Claimant did not need 
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replacement surgery, and Claimant should be grven a year with appropriate treatment and 
therapy before making a decision about surgery. 
9. On April28, 2009, Dr. Lindner declared Claimant had reached maximum medical 
improvement Dr. Lindner did not specify Claimant's permanent physical restriction; instead he 
stated that Claimant's permanent restrictions would be commensurate with the current level of 
restrictions. Dr. Lindner's prior restrictions were general limitations focused on avoiding work 
duties that Claimant was not capable of perfonning. 
10. Peggy Wilson, PT, perfonned a Functional Capacity Assessment of Claimant on 
June 3, 2009. The results indicated that Claimant had the ability to function at a light-medium to 
medium work level, but his lifting was limited to 61 pounds. Ms. Wilson reported that Claimant 
had good eye-hand coordination, good dexterity, and manipulation, as well as good overall body 
mechanics. 
11. Most recently, Claimant had an MRI on January 17, 2011. Dr. Richard Moore 
reviewed the MRI and concluded that Claimant needed a knee replacement 
12. When asked about his current restrictions at the time of the hearing, Claimant 
could not detail any limitations. He simply stated that if he has restrictions they are going to be 
the same as he had before. Claimant testified that he is able to get a full night's sleep without the 
use of any sleep aids, just Tylenol. He reported that his left knee pain only flares up once in 
awhile if he walks too much or exerts himself At another point in the hearing, Claimant testified 
that his left knee bothers him constantly and keeps him awake part of the night Claimant does 
not bend his left knee or squat. 
13. Claimant worked continuously for R&L beginning three days after the accident 
until the surgery in October 2008. After surgery Claimant returned to work in November with a 
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note from Dr. Lindner stating that Claimant should be allowed to "self-select some of his duties." 
Claimant testified that he was repeatedly required to hook up trailers using a dolly weighing 
2,500 pounds, which Claimant had to push and pull into position. Such work was beyond 
Claimant's capabilities and caused trouble with Claimant's knee. R&L terminated Claimant's 
employment on June 3, 2009, and on July 9, 2009, Claimant began working for Old Dominion 
driving a delivery truck. 
14. Claimant worked for Old Dominion for two years, first part time then full time in 
March of 2010. The full time work for Old Dominion included working at night. The regular 
schedule was to leave home at 9:30 p.m. and return home at 8:30 a.m. At this time both 
Claimant and his wife had weekends off. During his work with Old Dominion, Claimant had 
pain in his knee some days when he used it too much. Claimant was laid off by Old Dominion 
on June 30, 2011, because Claimant did not divulge the February 2008 accident on his 
employment application. 
15. During his time at Old Dominion, Claimant passed his Department of 
Transportation physical. Claimant indicated on the form that he had knee surgery on October 9, 
2009. The form also reports that Claimant has no problems with the knee, though Claimant 
denied \\'Titing that or telling that to the examiner. 
16. At hearing, Claimant testified that he believed he could return to his time of injury 
job with R&L Carriers with his current knee problems and restrictions. Further, Claimant 
believes that if he had not been laid off, he could still physically work at his prior job with Old 
Dominion. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA ,V, AND ORDER- 7 
:Mrs. Izaguirre 
17. Claimant and Mrs. Izaguirre were married in 1980. They have four grown 
children and three grandchildren. Mrs. Izaguirre has worked outside the home all but two years 
of their marriage. Mrs. Izaguirre handles the financial aspect of their marriage. Mrs. Izaguirre 
characterized their marriage as traditional. She testified that Claimant struggles to express his 
feelings and when he has pain in his knee he shuts down and keeps to himself. Mrs. Izaguirre 
explained that Claimant will sometimes confine himself to their bedroom even when their 
children and grandchildren are visiting. Even when Claimant is feeling well, kneeling on the 
ground to play with grandchildren is difficult. Additionally, connecting with Claimant was 
difficult because he worked nights. But since Claimant has been out of work he has been home 
more and the family relations are improving. Additionally, Claimant and his wife have met with 
their pastor twice for financial counseling since the accident. 
Martha Peterson 
18. Mrs. Peterson works for Intermountain Claims as a certified case manager. She 
has been involved as a nurse in the area of workers' compensation for 35 years. 
19. Mrs. Peterson was requested to research the cost and recovery time for a total 
knee replacement, as it is the treatment Claimant may receive in the future. She opined that 
longevity of a knee replacement is 15 to 20 years. Generally, people under 50 get a different 
procedure, resurfacing or hemioplasties, to address the knee issues and hold off on a total 
replacement as long as possible due to the longevity of knee replacements. 
20. Mrs. Peterson stated that a patient should be able to return to sedentary work 
approximately 60-65 days after surgery, and a patient would reach maximum medical 
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improvement (MMI) in eight to twelve months. During this time, a patient would standardly 
participate in six to eight weeks of physical therapy, attending three times per week. 
21. Mrs. Peterson produced a letter estimating the cost of a total knee replacement at 
$8,550.00 with an assist of $2,565.00. The cost of a resurfacing was estimated at $6,000.00 with 
an assist of$1,800.00. These figures do not include hospital costs. 
22. Mrs. Peterson opined that, given a good outcome for a total knee replacement on 
Claimant, he would be able to return to his time of injury job. 
The Third Party Claims 
23. June 2008, the Izaguirres retained D. Scott Summer to represent them in a lawsuit 
against the driver who caused Claimant's industrial accident. On October 22, 2009, Claimant 
and his wife settled their third party claim for $200,000. A letter drafted by Mr. Summer after 
the settlement breaks down the total settlement, attributing $100,000 to Mrs. Izaguirre's claim 
for loss of consortium and $100,000 to Claimant's personal injury claim. Per the attorney/client 
agreement, Mr. Summer was paid 35% of the settlement amount for his attorney fee, equaling 
$70,000. 
24. At the date of the third party mediation, Surety had a subrogated interest of 
$43,518.65. Surety and the Izaguirres, through their attorney, agreed to the payment of a 25% 
attorney fee on the recovery of the subrogated amount. Thus, Mr. Summer reimbursed 
$32,623.99 to Surety, and retained $10,879.66 payable as attorney fees. 
Kurt Holzer 
25. Mr. Holzer is a personal injury attorney in Boise, Idaho. Mr. Holzer has 
substantial experience with loss of consortium cases in the state. Mr. Holzer was plaintiff's 
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counsel in a recent case including a loss of consortium claim, during which the jury awarded 
$560,000 for the wife's loss of consortium claim. Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100 (2011). 
26. Mr. Holzer was asked by Claimant to evaluate Mrs. Izaguirre's loss of consortium 
claim. Mr. Holzer reviewed Claimant's medical records and interviewed the Claimant and his 
wife. The interview focused on the Izaguirres' moral system, their view of the world, and how 
those were impacted by the Claimant's injuries. Mr. Holzer opined that Mrs. Izaguirre wants her 
husband to be the leader of the family, the decision maker to whom she can defer to when 
questions and issues arise. When Claimant secludes himself in their bedroom, Mrs. Izaguirre 
feels alone and without support. Mrs. Izaguirre also has a fearful attitude about the future and 
Claimant's ability to provide an income. 
27. Starting with the understanding that the Izaguirres received $200,000 in the 
settlement, Mr. Holzer estimated that Mrs. Izaguirre's loss of consortium claim is valued at 
$50,000. He opined that a jury would have given $150,000 to Claimant and $50,000 to Mrs. 
Izaguirre. 
Merlyn Clark 
28. Mr. Clark is an attorney in Boise, Idaho focusing in commercial litigation, with a 
significant portion of time spent in mediation and arbitration. Mr. Clark estimated that around 
100 cases involved a claim for loss of consortium, out of the approximately 700 cases he has 
mediated. 
29. Particular to this case, Mr. Clark reviewed the medical records, correspondence, 
discovery responses, and deposition transcripts. He also reviewed some legal authorities on the 
matter of claims for loss of consortium in Idaho. 
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30. Mr. Clark found, in this case, that Claimant's injuries were not severe or 
disabling. Claimant was only off work for three days directly after the accident. He was off 
work after his arthroscopic surgery, and Dr. Lindner took Claimant off work because Employer 
required the perfonnance ofwork beyond Claimant's restrictions. Mr. Clark found no evidence 
that Claimant's injuries and restrictions significantly interfered with his family life. In fact, 
when Claimant was off work he was able to interact with his family in ways he was unable to 
when working nights. As testified by Mrs. Izaguirre, it was his change to night work that 
interfered with their family life. Mr. Clark ultimately opined that the loss of consortium claim 
had a value of$3,000 to $5,000. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
Jurisdiction 
31. The first issues raised m this matter are regarding the jurisdiction of the 
Commission over this unique case. 
32. Claimant contends that the Commission does have jurisdiction to decide the 
reasonable value of the elements of the Claimant's third party claim, including the value of the 
claim of Claimant's wife for her loss of consortium. Claimant does not believe the Commission 
has jurisdiction to decide the adequacy of the third party settlement. 
33. Defendants agree with Claimant, that the Conunission does not have jurisdiction 
to decide the adequacy of the third party settlement. They further aver that the Commission does 
not have the jurisdiction to differentiate between the types of damages or attempt to apportion 
the settlement. 
34. The Commission agrees that there is no need to evaluate the adequacy of the 
value of the third party settlement. The Commission is ill-equipped to assess a value on the 
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entirety of the claims brought by Claimant and his wife. Further, the settlement provides us with 
a realistic value of the claims by the inherent nature of a negotiated settlement which takes 
account of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims of the parties. Thus, the Commission will 
make no attempt at evaluating the adequacy of the third party claim. 
35. According to Idaho Code§ 72-707, "[a]ll questions arising under [the workers' 
compensation laws of this state], if not settled by agreement or stipulation of the interested 
parties with the approval of the commisswn, except as otherwise herein provided, shall be 
determined by the commission." The issue is whether the Commission has jurisdiction to 
evaluate the claims brought by Claimant and his wife, and the elements within those claims, 
including the loss of consortium claim. The reason that the Commission has been asked to 
evaluate the claims of the settlement is to facilitate the future reimbursement of Defendants' 
claim of subrogation. It is only in connection with the subrogation claim that this matter is 
before the Commission. 
36. Defendants' claim of subrogation to proceeds of the third party settlement arises 
under Idaho Code§ 72-223(3), which provides: 
If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having paid such 
compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated to the rights 
of the employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the 
employer's compensation liability. 
37. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Industrial Commission has 
jurisdiction over questions of subrogation claims under Idaho Code § 72-223. The Court stated 
that the question of whether the State Insurance Fund was entitled to subrogation pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-223(3) is a question arising under the workers' compensation law which is 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. Idaho State Ins. Fund ex rel. 
Forney v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 938 P.2d 1228 (1997). The Court has also held that the 
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Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction of whether a workers' compensation surety had 
waived its subrogation rights arising under Idaho Code § 72-223(3). Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. 
Fund, 126 Idaho 688,889 P.2d 717 (1994). 
38. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-707, the Commission is given the jurisdiction to 
decide matters within its statutory scheme. Here the Commission is being asked to clarify the 
Defendants' subrogation rights under Idaho Code § 72-223. In order to determine the 
subrogation right, we must first look at the settlement and evaluate the claims that will be subject 
ro the subrogation right. The questions presented arise under the workers' compensation law and 
require application of the workers' compensation Jaw; thus, the Industrial Commission has 
jurisdiction. 
The Third Party Settlement 
3 9. The Izaguirres and the third party entered into a settlement agreement releasing 
the third party from liability on Claimant's personal injury claim as well as Mrs. Izaguirre's loss 
of consortium claim. The settlement total was $200,000. A November 13, 2009 letter, signed by 
the Izaguirres and their prior counsel, attributes $100,000 to Claimant and $100,000 to Mrs. 
Izaguirre's loss of consortium claim. In the pending matter, both Claimant and Defendants agree 
that the third party settlement and the November 13, 2009 letter memorializing the settlement do 
not have any binding effect on Defendants' right of subrogation in this case. 
40. Claimant contends that the loss of consortium damage is his wife's separate 
property and that a portion of the settlement represents payment for damages not compensable 
under the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws; thus, those amounts are not subject to a claim for 
subrogation. Defendants argue that they are entitled to a right of subrogation in the entirety of a 
third party settlement, subject only to a deduction for attorney fees and costs. 
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41. The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an agreement between a 
third party tortfeasor and an injured employee can restrict the employer's subrogation rights. 
Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 721, 992 P.2d 164, 170 (1999). In Struhs, the 
claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and his workers' compensation surety paid 
$21,743.33 in benefits for his injuries. The responsible third party entered into a settlement with 
the claimant which stated that the settlement was paid for "general damages" alone, a category of 
damages that does not correspond to any of the various types of benefits payable under the 
workers' compensation laws. Therefore, claimant argued that surety's I.C. § 72-223 right of 
subrogation could not attach to the proceeds of the third party settlement. The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that claimant could not unilaterally characterize the third party recovery in an 
attempt to prevent surety from exercising its right of subrogation: 
It is a matter of first impression before this Court whether an agreement between a 
third-party tortfeasor and an injured employee can restrict the employer's 
subrogation rights. In automobile insurance cases, we have held that an insurer is 
not bound by a decision to which it was not a party. Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 
131 Idaho 357,361,956 P.2d 674,678 (1998); see also Anderson v. Farmers Ins. 
Co. ofldaho, 130 Idaho 755, 757, 947 P. 2d 1003, 1005 (1997). Employers have 
a statutory right to subrogation, and any characterization of damages to which the 
employer is not privy cannot change the employer's statutory rights. A contrary 
holding could lead to situations where employees and third-party tortfeasors 
reached unilateral agreements that would give the employee a double recovery or 
result in the culpable party not shouldering its full responsibility for damages 
results that would be diametrically opposed to the purposes of the subrogation 
statute. See Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho at 3, 740 P.2d at 45. Therefore, we hold 
that an employee and third party's unilateral actions cannot restrict an employer's 
subrogation rights. 
Other jurisdictions have reached a like result. In Mi1mesota, an employee may 
settle a tort claim with the third party without employer's consent, but such a 
settlement cannot affect the employer's subrogation rights. Naig v. Bloomington 
Sanitation, 258 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. 1977). Similarly, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals held that where workers' compensation benefits extended only to 
"economic" benefits, the surety was not bound by an employee's unilateral 
settlement with a third party that classified the settlement as one purely for 
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noneconomic damages. Sneath v. Express Messenger Serv. 931 P.2d 565, 568 
(Colo. Ct. app. 1996). 
For these reasons, we affirm the Industrial Commission's conclusion that Wausau 
could exercise its subrogation rights against Struhs' settlement with the Army. 
42. Of course, tllis case is different from Struhs in that Claimant does not insist upon 
the application of the allocation of the proceeds of settlement which was attempted by 
Claimant's former counsel. Indeed, Claimant acknowledges that such a unilateral allocation is 
invalid under Struhs. Rather, what Claimant proposes is that the evidentiary hearing of July 26, 
2011 provided the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence and make argument on how the 
proceeds of settlement should be allocated, and in this way accomplish the allocation which was 
prohibited by claimant's unilateral attempt at the same in Struhs. In short, per Claimant, Struhs 
does not prohibit the protection of certain elements of a third party recovery from the 
subrogation claim of the surety. Struhs merely prohibits Claimant from undertaking this action 
unilaterally. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Idaho statutory scheme clearly 
anticipates that the right of subrogation attaches to the entirety of a third party recovery, less 
surety's responsibility for the payment of its proportionate share of costs and attorney fees. 
Defendants argue that Struhs is, at the very least, consistent with this proposition. 
43. In the context of the question of whether or not a portion of the proceeds of a third 
party settlement are not subject to the I.C. § 72-223 right of subrogation, Struhs is just as 
important for what it does not say, as what it says. Having specifically found that the claimant in 
Struhs could not affect the surety's right of subrogation by incorporating certain language into 
the third party settlement to which surety was not a party, the Court concluded that the language 
of the agreement must be ignored, and that surety's right of subrogation was deemed to extend to 
the entire third party recovery. Had the Court been of the view that I.C. § 72-223 limited 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 15 
surety's right of subrogation to that portion of the proceeds of a third party recovery which 
corresponded to workers' compensation benefits paid, it would, presumably, have found it 
necessary to remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings along the lines of the 
inquiries which are before the Commission in the instant matter. That the Court did not do this 
in Struhs, is telling, and consistent with the plain language of I. C. § 72-223(3), which specifies: 
If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having paid such 
compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated to the rights 
of the employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's 
compensation liability. 
44. In connection with its discussion of the employer's obligation to pay its 
proportionate share of attorney fees and costs incurred by claimant in obtaining the third party 
recovery, the Comi in Cameron v. Minidoka Highway District, 125 Idaho 801, 874 P.2d 1108 
(1994) paraphrased the extent of the employer's right to be subrogated to the third party recovery 
as follows: 
Under this statute, when an employer is liable to a claimant for worker's 
compensation benefits, and the claimant obtains a recovery against a third 
party for the same injuries, the employer becomes subrogated to the 
claimant's rights in the third party recovery to the extent of the employer's 
compensation liability. I.C. Section 72-223(3). The plain wording of the 
statute entitled employers to benefit from third party recoveries to the extent 
of their compensation liability, whether the employer has already paid the 
compensation or the compensation liability remains to be paid in the future. It 
is undisputed in this case that the claimants' recovery from Union Pacific not 
only reimbursed the surety for the compensation benefits already paid to the 
claimants, it also extinguished all of the surety's liability to pay future 
compensation. 
45. We believe that a plain reading of the statute fails to reveal an intention on the 
part of the legislature to limit a surety's subrogated interest in a third party recovery to that 
portion of the third party recovery which corresponds to a benefit payable under the workers' 
compensation laws of this state. To construe the provisions of I. C. § 72-223(3) otherwise, would 
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frustrate the statutes' dual purposes of achieving an equitable distribution between responsible 
parties by assuring that the discharge of an obligation be paid by the person who in equity and 
good conscience ought to pay it and to prevent the injured claimant from obtaining a double 
recovery for an injury. (See, Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho 1, 740 P.2d 43 (1987). 
46. In so ruling, we recognize that claimant and surety may, of course, make their 
own agreement concerning the allocation of the proceeds of a third party settlement. Disputes of 
the type currently before the Commission could be avoided by encouraging claimants and 
subrogated sureties to address whether and/or how the proceeds of a third party recovery are to 
be allocated, contemporaneous with the settlement of the third party claim. If claimant and the 
subrogated carrier cannot come to agreement, then perhaps the third party settlement will be 
impeded. However, that is preferable to avoiding the issue, settling the third party case, and 
trusting the Industrial Commission to ascertain how the proceeds of a third party settlement of a 
personal injury claim should be allocated to special and general damages, and whether the 
settlement corresponds to workers' compensation benefits paid. This is an assessment that we 
are both ill-equipped and disinclined to undertake. Our ruling today encourages resolution of 
this important issue at the front end, i.e., at the time of the resolution of the third party claim, as 
it should be. 
4 7. Although we have found that the entire proceeds of the settlement of Mr. 
Izaguirre's claim are subject to the I.C. § 72-223 right of subrogation, this does not end our 
inquiry, since the settlement resolves not only Mr. Izaguirre's claim against the third party 
tortfeasor, but also Mrs. Izaguirre's claim against the third party tortfeasor for loss of 
consortium. Because the right created by I. C. § 72-223(3) for the benefit of the surety who has 
paid workers' compensation benefits, extends only to the "employee's" right to recover against a 
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negligent third party, we feel constrained by the language of the statute to ascertain which 
portion of the third party settlement is fairly attributable to Mrs. Izaguirre's claim for loss of 
consortium. We agree with Claimant that such portion of the third party settlement that is fairly 
attributable to the resolution of Mrs. Izaguirre's claim for loss of consortium is not subject to 
Surety's I. C. § 72-223(3) right of subrogation. 
48. First, although the claim for loss of consortium does depend, in the first instance, 
on the fact that Mr. Izaguirre suffered an injury, and is, in that sense, derivative, it is also clear 
that the claim for loss of consortium is personal to Mrs. Izaguirre. As an element of non-
economic damages, i.e. as a measure of Mrs. Izaguirre's loss of the companionship, services, and 
affection of her injured spouse, such damages constitute the separate property of Mrs. Izaguirre. 
See, Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company, 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974). As such, the 
entire portion of the third party settlement attributable to Ms. Izaguirre's claim for loss of 
consortium is protected from the subrogation claim of Surety. 
49. With the above findings, the Commission is now required to place a value on Mrs. 
Izaguirre's loss of consortium claim. The Commission agrees that Mrs. Izaguirre has suffered a 
loss of consortium, and that the settlement agreement resolves her claim. However, attaching a 
dollar amount to that loss is a difficult task of a type the Commission does not routinely perform. 
50. The Commission will focus on the testimony of Claimant and his wife in its 
synthesis of the particular facts which demonstrate the loss of the aid, care, comfort, society, 
companionship, services, protection and conjugal affection of Claimant due to his injuries. 
Further, the expert opinions of Mr. Holzer and Mr. Clark will serve as guides in determining a 
monetary value for Mrs. Izaguirre's claim and will be discussed below. 
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51. The expert opinions on the overall value of all claims by the Claimant and his 
wife diverge, as one might expect. Mr. Holzer found that the Izaguirres had been 
undercompensated by the $200,000 settlement; while Mr. Clark found that they had been 
overcompensated, valuing the claim at $155,000. Thus, in comparing the opinions it is important 
to note that Mr. Holzer constrained his value of the loss of consortium claim to the total value of 
the settlement, even though he argued that the total settlement was low. In order to better 
compare the expert opinions we must place them into the confines of the $200,000 settlement. 
Mr. Holzer's loss of consortium calculation was made under the assumption of a $200,000 value 
of the total claims. However, Mr. Clark's valuation must be adjusted by using the ratio of 
$5,000 to $155,000. Accordingly, we calculate the high end of Mr. Clark's opined value to be 
approximately $6,450. Therefore, comparing the expert opinions under the assun1ption of a 
$200,000 value, we find the range of expert opinions to be from $6,450 to $50,000 attributable to 
Mrs. Izaguirre's loss of consortium claim. 
52. Mr. Holzer testified that the loss of consortium claim is worth a third to a quarter 
of the entire settlement, but his written opinion ultimately states $50,000. Mr. Holzer further 
explained that he estimated the value of Claimant's claim and reached his conclusion on the 
value of the loss of consortium claim by defining the loss of consortium claim as having a value 
equal to some fraction of Claimant's claim. Mr. Holzer explained that Mrs. Izaguirre feels a loss 
in the marriage because of a lack in intimate companionship. Mrs. Izaguirre feels embarrassed to 
pressure Claimant and she suffers from emotional turmoil and anger at Claimant because he is 
not always emotionally and physically available. 
53. Mr. Clark found no evidence that Claimant's injuries and restrictions significantly 
interfered with his family life. When Claimant was off work he was able to interact with his 
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family in ways he was unable to when working nights. As testified by Mrs. Izaguirre, it was his 
change to night work that interfered with their family life. 
54. Mrs. Izaguirre has stable employment earning $20.70 per hour. She keeps the 
bank account for the couple, fills out any required forms or paperwork, and provides 
interpretation for Claimant when necessary. Mrs. Izaguirre testified that when Claimant's left 
knee was hurting him he would become grumpy. Claimant does not participate in as many 
physical activities such as bike riding, walking, and playing with the grandsons because of his 
knee. 
55. The restrictions and pain caused by Claimant's left knee have changed the way he 
behaves and interacts with his wife. Yet the physical restrictions may not be as severe as 
Claimant now avers. When questioned about his restrictions, Claimant was unable to recall any 
restrictions for his knee. He is not taking any medication for pain relief other than Tylenol 
occasionally. The Izaguirres still take walks and ride bikes together. Additionally, Claimant has 
stated that he is physically able to return to work at his time of injury job. 
56. Claimant was not working nights when the Izaguirres entered into the third party 
settlement and therefore, Claimant's absence from the family was less dramatic at the time a 
monetary value was accepted by the Izaguirres. Further by the time this case reached hearing, 
Claimant was no longer working nights and was home most of the time due to his 
unemployment. While it is uncertain what future work schedules Claimant may hold, it is clear 
that working nights is not a physician imposed restriction and is not something that has been 
mandated by Claimant's industrial injuries. The troubles felt by Mrs. Izaguirre while Claimant 
was working nights are understandable but they are not worthy of great value in her loss of 
consortium claim. 
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57. Mrs. Izaguirre looks to Claimant as the leader of the family. The loss of 
patriarchal leadership is indeed important, but the effect that Claimant's injury has had on his 
leadership role is in question. He is not on prescription medication and needs no aids to sleep at 
night. Working nights impeded Mrs. Izaguirre's time and companionship with Claimant, but as 
of the date of hearing, that impediment had been removed. 
58. The Commission is more persuaded by the analysis of Mr. Clark. As opined by 
Mr. Clark, the testimony as a whole establishes that Claimant is not in severe pain and his injury 
has not produced minimal specific and concrete harm to Mrs. Izaguirre. Further, many of the 
problems created when Claimant was working at night are negligible for the reasons discussed 
above. Yet in adopting the opinion of Mr. Clark, the Commission 11nds it lacked sufficient 
recognition for the loss of familial leadership suffered by Mrs. Izaguirre. In reviewing the 
evidence, particularly the testimony of the Izaguirres and the legal experts, the Commission 
concludes that Mrs. Izaguirre's claim for loss of consortium, evaluated within the confines of the 
Izaguirres' third party settlement, has a value of$9,000, which is not subject to Defendants' right 
of subrogation. The remainder of the settlement is subject to subrogation, minus attorney fees 
and costs, for future compensation benefits. 
Attorney Fees 
59. The final issue is determining the amount of costs and attorney fees that should be 
deducted from Defendants' Idaho Code § 72-223 recovery pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(4)-
(5). Idaho Code§ 72-223(4)-(5) provide several options for how the attorney fees and costs may 
be borne by claimant and employer. 
4) Unless otherwise agreed, upon any recovery by the employee against the third 
party, the employer shall pay or have deducted from its subrogated portion 
thereof, a proportionate share of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the 
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employee in obtaining such recovery unless one (1) or more of the following 
circumstances exist: 
(a) If prior to the date of a written retention agreement between the 
employee and an attorney, the employer has reached an agreement with the third 
party, in writing, agreeing to pay in full the employer's subrogated interest; 
(b) If the employee alleges or asserts a position in the third party claim 
adverse to the employer, then the commission shall have jurisdiction to determine 
a reasonable fee, if any, for services rendered to the employer; 
(c) If there is a joint effort between the employee and employer to pursue 
a recovery from the third party, then the commission shall have jurisdiction to 
determine a reasonable fee, if any, and apportion the costs and attorney's fees 
between the employee and employer. 
(5) If the amount recovered from the third party exceeds the amount of the 
subrogated portion payable to the employer for past compensation benefits paid, 
then to the extent the employer has a future subrogated interest in that portion of 
the third party recovery paid to the employee, the employer shall receive a credit 
against its future liability for compensation benefits. Such credit shall apply as 
future compensation benefits become payable, and the employer shall reimburse 
the employee for the proportionate share of attorney's fees and costs paid by the 
employee in obtaining that portion of the third party recovery corresponding to 
the credit claimed. The employer shall not be required to pay such attorney's fees 
and costs related to the future credit prior to the time the credit is claimed. 
However, the employer and employee may agree to different terms if approved by 
the industrial commission. 
60. Per I.C. § 72-223(4) "unless otherwise agreed," where a third party recovery is 
obtained, the surety shall pay from its share of the recovery, a proportionate share of the costs 
and attorney fees incurred by claimant in pursuit of the third party claim. The record establishes 
that following settlement of the third party claim, Claimant's then attorney, Scott Summer, took 
a 35% contingent fee, or $70,000. As well, Claimant incuned and paid costs in the amount of 
$307.60. 
61. We have found that Mrs. Izaguirre's claim for loss consortium has a value of 
$9,000.00, thus leaving $191,000.00 of the $200,000.00 settlement subject to the claim of 
Surety. Surety's proportionate share of costs and fees incurred in connection with the pursuit of 
the third party claim is therefore $67,143.76. 
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62. Following settlement of the third party claim, Claimant's former counsel held in 
trust the sum of$43,518.65, representing the workers' compensation subrogation claim as of the 
date of the settlement of the third party claim. The proportionate share of costs and attorney fees 
attributable to a recovery of this sum is $15,298.46. Therefore, by operation of statute, Surety 
was only entitled to receive $28,251.19 as of the date of settlement of the third party claim. 
However, Mr. and Mrs. Izaguirre, through their former attorney, actually reimbursed to Surety 
the sum of $32,623.99, after having agreed to a reduction of the Surety's obligation to reimburse 
Claimant for its proportionate share of costs and attorney fees incurred in obtaining the sum of 
$43,518.65. Why Claimant's former attorney acceded to this arrangement is unclear, but the 
record is undisputed that the arrangement was a result of an agreement between Mr. and Mrs. 
Izaguirre and Surety. 
63. I. C. § 72-223( 4) makes it clear that the parties are authorized to make an 
agreement that surety shall reimburse claimant for something less than its proportionate share of 
attorney fees and costs. (See, I.C. § 72-223(4)). We feel constrained to honor this agreement, at 
least insofar as it relates to the $43,518.65 previously paid to Surety. However, we do not feel 
constrained to apply this same reduction to the balance of Surety's entitlement to the balance of 
the $191,000.00, which is subject to the Claimant's subrogation. There is no evidence that the 
parties have reached any agreement that Claimant shall be paid something other than what is 
contemplated by statute for attorney fees he incurred in obtaining the balance of the settlement 
subject to the subrogation claim. Therefore, on the balance of the settlement proceeds subject to 
Surety's right of subrogation ($147,481.35), Surety is obligated to pay the sum of $51,845.25 as 
its proportionate share of attorney fees and costs incurred by Claimant in pursuit of the third 
party recovery. 
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64. As set forth in the monetary breakdown above, the amount received by Claimant 
from the third party settlement exceeds the amount of the subrogated portion that has been paid 
to Defendants. At the time of the third party settlement, Claimant reimbursed Surety the sum of 
$32,623.99 for compensation paid as of that date. To the extent Defendants have a future 
subrogated interest in the remaining portion of the third party recovery paid to Claimant, 
Defendants shall received a credit against its future liability for compensation benefits. (See, 
Idaho Code §72-223(5)). Such a credit shall apply as future compensation benefits become 
payable, not necessarily upon issuance of this decision. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the claims m Mr. and Mrs. 
Izaguirre's third party settlement and determine which claims will be subject to Defendants' 
right of subrogation under Idaho Code § 72-223. 
2. The entire proceeds of the settlement of Claimant's claim are subject to the Idaho 
Code § 72-223 right of subrogation. Mrs. Izaguirre's claim for loss of consortium is not subject 
to the Idaho Code § 72-223 right of subrogation. 
3. The value ofMrs. Izaguirre's loss of consortium claim portion ofthe third party 
settlement, which is not subject to Defendants' right of subrogation, is $9,000. 
4. The prior recovery by Defendants of a portion of Claimant's third party settlement 
with a proportionate share of fees and costs deducted, will be enforced as agreed upon by the 
parties. However, on the balance of the settlement proceeds subject to Surety's right of 
subrogation ($14 7 ,481.35), Surety is obligated to pay the sum of $51,845.25 as its proportionate 
share of attorney fees and costs incurred by Claimant in pursuit of the third party recovery. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AL~D ORDER- 24 
II J, 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
issues adjudicated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
_-.---
DATED this ;:i{<J- day of c_ )w~ '2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ilh!&r=l 
R.D. Maynard, Com!711ssioner 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 25 
f/7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certiJY that on the !{,r day of ~ , 2012 a true and correct copy 
of FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER was served by regular 
United States Mail upon: 
JON BAUMAN 
KRISTINA WILSON 
251 EAST FRONT STREET, SUITE 300 
PO BOX 1539 
BOISE ID 83701 
RICHARD OWEN 
206 12TH AVENUE ROAD 
POBOX278 
NAMPA ID 83653 
mw 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 26 
/I?J 
RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant/ Appellant 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RUBIO IZAGUIRRE, ) 
) I. C. No. 2008-011032 




R&L CARRIERS SHARED ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 












ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., ) 
) 
_ .. ·-· lJ ~, '--
-"" -Surety/Respondent, ) .. . J) 
C) 
y 0 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED SURETY AND EMPLOYER, by and through their attorney of 
record, Jon M. Bauman, Boise, Idaho and THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named Appellant, RUBIO IZAGUIRRE, 
hereby appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final 
order of the Industrial Commission entered in the above-entitled action on the 31st day of January, 
2012. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-- PG. 1 
J 
//9 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED as follows: 
1. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgements and/or 
orders described above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11(d). 
2. The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(A) I.A.R. is requested; 
3. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the agency's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
(a) All briefs filed by the parties including exhibits and attachments thereto and the 
original decision herein; 
(b) All deposition transcripts lodged with th<' Commission; 
(c) All exhibits admitted into evidence. 
4. I certify; 
(a) That the Industrial Commission has been paid the estimated fee of $100.00 for 
preparation of the transcript; 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the agency's record has been paid; 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served, pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED This vday of March, 2012. 
By: ___ v_~-~-·--~-~-"_._~ --
RichardS. Owen 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-- PG. 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of March, 2012, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
RichardS. Owen 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-- PG. 3 













Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Appealed By: 
SUPREME COURT NO. _5Cj 7 5 () 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Industrial Commission, 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman presiding 
IC 2008-011032 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
filed January 31, 2012. 
Richard S. Owen 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, ID 83653 
Jon Bauman 
Kristina Wilson 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83 701 
Rubio Izaguirre, Claimant 
FILED- ORIGINAL 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR RUBIO IZAGUIRRE- 1 
Supreme Court_Court ~als 1 
Entered on ATS b ·~ -~ J ;A) 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
R&L Carriers Shared Services, L.L.C. and 
Zurich American Insurance Co., Defendants 
March 5, 2012 
$100.00 to Industrial Commission; 
$86 check to be reissued by Counsel for Claimant 
M.D. Willis, CSR 
M.D. Willis, Inc. 
P.O. Box 1241 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript 
has been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR RUBIO IZAGUIRRE- 2 
CERTIFICATION 
I,. Marie Wilson, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order; and the 
whole thereof, in IC case number 2008-011032 for Rubio Izaguirre. 
CERTIFICATION- RUBIO IZAGUIRRE- 1 
RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorney for Claimant! Appellant 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RUBIO IZAGUIRRE, ) 
) I. C. No. 2008-011032 




R&LCARRIERSSHARED ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 







ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO., ) 
) 
Surety/Respondent, ) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED SURETY AND EMPLOYER, by and througi their-4ttorney of 
record, Jon M. Bauman, Boise, Idaho and THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named Appellant, RUBIO IZAGUIRRE, 
hereby appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final 
order of the Industrial Commission entered in the above-entitled action on the 31st day ofJanuary, 
2012. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-- PG. 1 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED as follows: 
1. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgements and/or 
orders described above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (d). 
2. The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(A) I.A.R. is requested; 
1. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
ill Whether Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in deciding that the 
Defendants' subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code 72-223 extended to all of 
Claimant's third-party settlement, including any monies which Claimant received for 
pain and suffering, and; 
.{Q} Whether the Industrial Commission erred in failing to designate part of Claimant's 
settlement as pain and suffering. 
:3-:-4. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the agency's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
(a) All briefs filed by the parties including exhibits and attachments thereto and the 
original decision herein; 
(b) All deposition transcripts lodged with the Commission; 
(c) All exhibits admitted into evidence. 
4: 5. I certify; 
(a) That the Industrial Commission has been paid the estimated fee of $100.00 for 
preparation of the transcript; 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the agency's record has been paid; 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 




(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served, pursuant to Rule 
DATED This h day of March, 2012. 
By:-----.:.....~---~---­
Richard S. Owen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this!?.._ day of March, 2012, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jon M. Bauman 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
RichardS. Owen 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-- PG. 3 
12 ELAM BURKE 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
ELAM&BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
·Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Bauman- ISB #2989 
Wilson - ISB #7962 
ELAM BURKE :57 p.m. 03-21-2012 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 








FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I.C. No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST THAT ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS BE INCLUDED IN 
AGENCY'S RECORD 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
REQUEST THAT ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS BE INCLUDED IN AGENCY'S RECORD-
l 
3/4 
03/21/2012 WED 17:25 [TX/RX NO 6771] [@ 003 
Jon M. Bauman 
Kristina J. Wilson 
ELAM & BURKE, P .A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Bauman - ISB #2989 
Wilson - ISB #7962 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 








FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I.C. No. 2008-011032 
REQUEST THAT ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS BE INCLUDED IN 
AGENCY'S RECORD 





REQUEST THAT ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS BE INCLUDED IN AGENCY'S RECORD 
1 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28(c), Respondents R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC 
and Zurich American Insurance Co., request the additional documents be included in the 
agency's record in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b)(3): 
(a) All motions filed by the parties including exhibits and attachments thereto. 
DATED this2f day ofMarch, 2012. 
ah, f the Firm 
Attorneys for De endants/Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this e:::::=f day of March, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Richard Owen 
RICHARD OWEN LAW OFFICE 
206 12th A venue Road 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
¥U.S. Mail 
Hand Deliv 
REQUEST THAT ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS BE INCLUDED IN AGENCY'S RECORD-
2 
I 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Marie Wilson, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme 
Court No. 39750-2012 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of 
Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ), and the Defendants' /Respondents' Request that 
Additional Documents be Included in the Agency's Record, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
28(c). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are 
correctly listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon 
settlement of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein. 
DATED this3ofl1day 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (SC # 39750-2012 Re: Rubio Izaguirre) -1 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RUBIO IZAGUIRRE, 
Claimant/ Appellant, SUPREl\1E COURT NO. 39750-2012 
v. 




ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., 
Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
TO: STEPHEN KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Richard S. Owen, for the Claimant/ Appellant; and 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
Jon Bauman/Kristina Wilson, for the Defendant(s) Employer & Surety/Respondents. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Richard S. Owen 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, ID 83653 
Jon Bauman 
Kristina Wilson 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83 70 1 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
(S.C. Docket# 39750-2012 Re: Rubio Izaguirre- 1 
/3 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, 
all parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Agency's 
Record, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to 
the Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Reporter's Transcript and 
Agency's Record shall be deemed settled. 
,Y"-
DATED this 3Q_ day 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
Marie Wilson ~ 
Assistant Commission Secretary~_ 
(S.C. Docket# 39750-2012 Re: Rubio Izaguirre- 2 
' 
